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To Homo Faber (man as maker), the Promethean revolt 
against nature is an act of  mastership. 
Guided by the ideals of  utility and beauty, the world 
of  making is always rooted in the transformation of  means 
into ends. Human life is fragile; the objects we create give 
us durability. They reify what would otherwise be lost with 
every generation. They condition our existence. Like the 
table that both separates and unites, our experience of  
others is rooted in an in-between world of  shared things. 
However, because we are never fully conditioned beings — 
that is, we are never fully for or against others — the world 
of  things never entirely constitutes an end in itself. Homo 
Faber transforms means into ends, which can only ever, 
once again, become means. If  this were not so, we would 
have built the ideal city, or reached the end of  history. 
One shortfall of  making is that it marshals reflection 
forward, into an idealized future where we make thoughts 
captive to their utilitarian ends, and deem the infinite 
newness of  each person’s unique identity too haphazard. 
Just as the builder does not need others to accomplish his 
task, neither does the ruler need the opinion of  his subjects 
to rule; we have replaced the uncertainty of  plural action 
with the conviction inherent in pre-determined ideas. 
The line of  inquiry follows Hannah Arendt’s political 
theory of  the degradation of  political space. Storytelling 
— as both subjective and structural critique — reflects 
on the mode of  acting, as inherited from the tradition of  
making, and the potential harm it poses.
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‘One of the world’s worst graveyards. Right?’
 
Right. No question. Maybe the worst.
 
‘Chaps dying like flies while we speak. Knee-jerk tribal killings, disease, 
starvation, ten-year-old soldiers and sheer fucking incompetence from the 




‘Elections won’t bring democracy, they’ll bring chaos. The winners will 
scoop the pool and tell the losers to go fuck themselves. The losers will say 
the game was fixed and take to the bush. And since everyone’s voted on 
ethnic lines anyway, they’ll be back where they started and worse.
John Le Carre - The Mission Song
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PrefAce
2TOO MUCH TIME, OR TOO LITTLE
[fig. 0.1] 
3 INTRODUCTION
Since independence in the 1960’s, outwardly, not much has 
changed in central Africa. For the past 55 years, the dreams of 
radical pan-Africanists, the promises of the urban évolué, the 
international clamoring for ‘justice’, have all but lost their potency. 
Problematically, the violent transience of the post-colony - its 
destroyed infrastructure, political corruption, rape, and theft – is 
the prophetic realization of colonial rhetoric. As Frantz Fanon 
reminds us in The Wretched of the Earth, the colonist’s role was to 
civilize the baser nature of the colonized. “We made this land… If 
we leave, all is lost, and this land will return to the Dark Ages”.1 
From a New York Times article published the day after Congolese 
Independence on July 1st, 1960:
Congo Rises From Stone Age to Statehood in Few Decades… Fifty-five 
years ago, in the heartland of darkest Africa, which formally became the 
independent Republic of Congo today, the wheel was not used, language 
was not written, cannibalism and witchcraft were common, and the site of 
the capital, Leopoldville, was still a dense jungle.2
Following this western lineage further, the return of primitivist 
violence in the post-colony would signal not simply the atavism 
of western values, but a wider incompatibility with civilization; 
intervention becomes, not simply a function of aid, but a moral 
necessity. As put by a colonialist, 
In entering into contact with [the Bantu peoples] the Belgians have found 
them in a state of extreme barbarity and corruption. Nothing which these 
disinherited peoples remember, nothing in their traditions, their social 
life, nor the material objects which surround them give any indication of 
a better period in the past… The intelligence of the black, although quite 
lively, only seems to exercise itself in evil.3
During his independence speech, King Baudouin of Belgium made 
no defense for Belgian atrocities committed under colonialism; 
instead he turned to the wider civilizing mission:
For eighty years Belgium has sent your land the best of her sons, first to 
eric Arthur blAir,
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deliver the Congo basin from the odious slave trade which was decimating 
its population. Later to bring together the different tribes which, though 
former enemies, are now preparing to form the greatest of the Independent 
states of Africa.4
King Baudouin went on to praise the colonial progress in 
building communications, founding medical services and schools, 
modernizing agricultural production, constructing cities, and 
developing industry. “It is your job, gentlemen, to show that we 
were right in trusting you”.5 
In the Manichean world of colonial compartmentalization, 
‘development’ was necessary to sublimate the deeper colonial 
function of exploitation. As Fanon writes, 
The customs of the colonized, their traditions, their myths, especially their 
myths, are the very mark of this indigence and innate depravity. This is why 
we should place DDT, which destroys parasites, carriers of disease, on the 
same level as Christianity, which roots out heresy, natural impulses, and evil. 
The decline of yellow fever and the advances made by evangelizing form 
part of the same balance sheet.6
Given the blatant obliqueness of colonial action — racism 
disguised as universal humanism, or citizenship with no intention 
of equality — situating interventionist action in the post-colony is 
problematic. Belying its stated moral imperative, or worldly ‘good’, 
interventionist action may qualify its colonial lineage; if so, it 
risks propagating the status quo, or worse, generating newer forms 
of exploitation. Beyond the simplistic reductionism of racism, 
violence and disorder in the post-colony remains a complex north-
south collaboration.  
Written at the height of  independence movements in 1961, 
The Wretched of  the Earth begged the liberated African nations to 
shed their colonial identity. If  they merely wanted to follow the 
colonial path, leave it to the Europeans to do so. Liberation for 
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Fanon was not merely an end in itself, where the re-organization 
of  wealth, land or power, would bring justice. Rather, he sought 
to create a new identity for the African man: “For Europe, for 
ourselves and for humanity, comrades, we must make a new 
start, develop a new way of  thinking, and endeavor to create a 
new man.”7 
-
Before reflecting on development in Africa, it is worth reflecting 
on development, or making, within the wider frame of human 
activity. In the 1958 book The Human Condition, Hannah Arendt 
argued that the apolitical shift towards making has come largely 
at the expense of political action. “The modern age, in its early 
concern with tangible products and demonstrable profits or its 
later obsession with smooth functioning and sociability, was not 
the first to denounce the idle uselessness of action and speech in 
particular and of politics in general.”8 The historic panacea offered 
for the three-part failings of action — the futility of its product, the 
unpredictability of its outcome, and the anonymity of its authors 
— was to eliminate plurality and substitute it with hegemony. To 
exemplify this, Arendt pointed to the utopian reorganization of 
Greek politics initiated by the philosophers’ mistrust of action, 
to whose end the ‘quiet of contemplation’ has permeated modern 
interventionist logic. 
From the fact that no meaningful human life exists outside 
the presence of  others, life is defined by the living together of  
men. If  men were not distinct, language or action would not 
be necessary to mediate between identical needs. If  men were 
not equal, no comprehension between actors would be possible. 
Unlike togetherness, a function of  the serial reproduction of  
like beings, plurality is defined by the presence of  others. For 
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Arendt, the paradox inherent within a plurality requires action 
and speech to mediate disparate agents. Unlike making, Arendtian 
action is the only product of  human life whose existence is owed 
exclusively to the coming together of  people.
The term action has its roots in the interrelated Greek terms 
archein, ‘to begin’, and prattein, ‘to achieve’, (corresponding to 
the latin verbs agere ‘to set in motion’ and gerere ‘to bear’). It 
is the nature of  beginning, writes Arendt, that newness is not 
an abstraction but the embodiment of  the diversity we inherit 
from birth. The ability to begin, to make real the image of  our 
uniqueness, is thus the actualization of  the human condition of  
plurality. 
Compared with making, where a given end could be effectively 
communicated by sign language (its idea already collectively 
held) or good and bad works achieved in anonymous silence or 
violence (where the ‘self ’ is hidden from others), action requires 
the accompaniment of  speech precisely because it reveals to 
others what is not known already, reveals the uniqueness of  the 
beginner. It is because we are never fully conditioned beings 
(affected by made objects), that the course of  action cannot be 
predicted by what preceded it. By beginning, the actor risks the 
disclosure of  his image, whilst in appearing the actor cannot 
escape his subjective revelation.  
The action he begins is humanly disclosed by the word, and though his 
deed can be perceived in its brute physical appearance without verbal 
accompaniment, it becomes relevant only through the spoken word in 
which he identifies himself as the actor, announcing what he does, has done, 
and intends to do.9 
The connection between revelation and beginning becomes 
important when we attempt to understand meaning. Though words 
and deeds may be overt and intentional, the specific consequence 
of the initial and subsequent acts remain hidden to the beginner, 
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and to others who carry the action forward. Fundamentally, this is 
because human uniqueness cannot be described without resorting 
to a description of commonalities, the qualities they share with 
others. “It [the nature of being] excludes in principle our ever 
being able to handle these affairs as we handle things whose nature 
is at our disposal because we can name them.”10 In our collective 
living together as individuals, neither subjecting nor subject 
to other people, or even entirely for or against each other, the 
beginner and the achiever are non-linear, non-exclusive functions. 
Because the actor always moves among and in relation to other 
acting beings, he is “never merely a ‘doer’ but always, and at the 
same time, a sufferer.”11 Meaning only becomes apparent at the end 
of the event, its course laid bare in the backwards glance of history. 
…[I]n any series of events that together form a story with a unique meaning 
we can at best isolate the agent who set the whole process into motion; 
and although this agent frequently remains the subject, the “hero” of the 
story, we never can point unequivocally to him as the author of its eventual 
outcome.12
From the standpoint of what is known or commonly understood, 
the variability of action is shorthand for the unpredictability of its 
outcome. Archein, to begin, can be understood as newness, rather 
than merely motion. 
The new always happens against the overwhelming odds of statistical laws 
and their probability, which for all practical, everyday purposes amounts 
to certainty; the new therefore always appears in the guise of a miracle. 
The fact that man is capable of action means that the unexpected can be 
expected of him, that he is able to perform what is infinitely improbable. 
And this again is possible only because each man is unique13
The boundlessness of action, with its simultaneous chains of re-
action, could only ever be contained by either the homogenization 
of identity (where action is directed in singular for or against) 
or the removal of the potential for beginning altogether (the 
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banishment of the social agent). Natality, Arendt’s term to signify 
the miracle of beginning is rooted in appearing in the world with 
others as distinct but equal voices.
The space of  action is never a static construct, never reduced 
to a product. Though legislation and architecture may augment 
or limit the space where people come together, they are not 
themselves political action. The space of  appearance is not a 
physical space, but that which exists between people. As such, 
the law whose function it is to keep society within bounds, and 
architecture, which protects the boundaries of  the territories 
from outside, are never fully able to suppress action. 
The boundlessness of action is only the other side of its tremendous capacity 
for establishing relationships, that is, its specific productivity; this is why the 
old virtue of moderation, of keeping within bounds, is indeed one of the 
political virtues par excellence…14
To Arendt, the Platonic shift was fundamentally an insertion 
of philosophy into political theory, ostensibly to justify the 
philosopher’s way of life. The central division between philosophy 
and politics (with respect to action) was that, philosophically, the 
good, or the beautiful, was located somewhere outside of human 
affairs: the ‘eternal’ could only be understood in the absolute quiet 
of contemplation. “Every movement, the movements of body and 
soul as well as of speech and reasoning, must cease before truth”.15 
Freedom for the philosophers, meant independence from human 
wants or needs. From the notion that nothing of human hands 
could match the beauty and truth of the physical kosmos, Plato 
and subsequent philosophers took from the eternal the ‘idea’ 
of good which was then applied to human affairs. Against the 
vagaries of plurality, the philosopher-king remained unmoved by 
others. Against the invisible hand of authorship, the philosopher-
king remained master. Accordingly, a wedge was driven into the 
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political apparatus of action. By removing plurality from action, 
archein, ‘to begin’, increasingly lost its dependence on prattein, ‘to 
achieve’, and in so doing changed it’s meaning altogether. Through 
the isolation of archein from prattein, the original meaning, ‘to 
begin’, changed into ‘to lead’, and finally, ‘to rule’, until ultimately 
‘beginning’ disappeared altogether, and the latter part prattein, ‘to 
achieve’, subsumed the entire definition of action.  In this way, the 
idea (manifest in standards and rules) supplanted the corrupting 
variability of words and deeds. With the objectivity of ideas lying 
outside the realm of others, one man remained master of his doing 
from beginning to end. The meaning of action became more 
closely related to making. As Arendt writes, 
…the division between knowing and doing, so alien to the realm of action, 
whose validity and meaningfulness are destroyed the moment thought 
and action part company, is an everyday experience in fabrication, whose 
processes obviously fall into two parts: first, perceiving the image or shape 
(eidos) of the product-to-be, and then organizing the means and starting 
the execution.16
Central to this division (where those who know do not do, and 
those who do, do not know) is the conception of the ruler who by 
virtue of the idea ‘makes’ his City as the sculptor makes a statue. 
Through law, the management of individual subjectivity could be 
reduced to its most basic function. 
In the Republic, [Plato’s] division between rulers and ruled is guided by 
the relationship between expert and layman; in the Statesman, he takes his 
bearings from the relation between knowing and doing; and in the Laws, 
the execution of unchangeable laws is all that is left to the statesman or 
necessary for the functioning of the public realm. What is most striking 
in this development is the progressive shrinkage of faculties needed for the 
mastering of politics.17
The utopian hubris of the mastery of human affairs, implied in 
the reduction of political action to that of the will of a few ‘strong 
men’, is predicated on the notion that society can be ‘made’ in the 
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first place. The hallmark of action in its singular form (whether as 
individual, or as a group) is that despite its outward appearance of 
plural agents, it is structurally against plurality. A work bestowed 
from benefactor to recipient is always unidirectional, and fails to 
establish a relationship between actors. 
From the Arendtian perspective of action, the historic continuum 
of empire, third-world, global-south, can be re-imagined not 
from the merits espoused by western civilizing missions — the 
waves of architects, lawyers, politicians and journalists — but 
from the collapse of the commons underlying durability-focused 
intervention. This is not to say that the products of work, the 
human artifact, are not necessary for productive life. It is against 
the impermanence of nature and destructiveness of time, that 
work overcomes. The powerlessness of reproduction, and the 
temporality of action would make no gains if there was not the 
worldliness of work. However, against these needs, stands the 
Arendtian critique of the substitution of making for acting. The 
sovereignty of the individual and his or her idea(ls) risks in the 
first instance reducing action to productive categories of means 
and ends, and in the second, removing from human affairs the 
condition of natality. By establishing ‘higher’ ends at the outset, 
the category of means is rendered unaccountable. “As long as we 
believe that we deal with ends and means in the political realm, 
we shall not be able to prevent anybody’s using all means to pursue 
recognized ends.”18 Secondly, perceived sovereignty, the mastery 
of self and society, necessarily comes at the price of plurality. 
From the connection Arendt has established between plurality 
and natality, the overcoming of plurality would be less a victory 
of individual sovereignty than the arbitrary domination of others. 
The popular belief in a “strong man” who, isolated against others, owes his 
strength to his being alone is either sheer superstition, based on the delusion 
11 INTRODUCTION
that we can “make” something in the realm of human affairs—“make” 
institutions or laws, for instance, as we make tables and chairs, or make men 
“better” or “worse”—or it is conscious despair of all action, political and 
non-political, coupled with the utopian hope that it may be possible to treat 
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[Fig. 0.2]
13 PART I: KINSHASA
Procure saint Anne | 1914
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15 PART I: KINSHASA
Photography, it is said, is illegal. Where it is not illegal, it is 
culturally unacceptable. I am told that for 60 USD you can 
purchase a photography permit, which, in theory, takes you over 
the first hurdle, but in practice gets you over neither. The reality is, 
the legitimate flow of money is rerouted to local actors who simply 
arrogate the authority of the state. Formally known as a bribe.   
It is a curious thing to officially disallow photography. Not the 
least of practical reasons being the ubiquitous presences of camera-
equipped cell phones across Africa. What is being forbidden 
then? Do shame and poverty run parallel, where the exploitation 
inherent in perverse images inflames reactionary indignation? Or is 
it not self-conscious at all, but self-defensive: a schizophrenic state 
always hiding from others while invasively present at its furthest 
margins, simultaneously filling all space while destructively 
absent. This totalitarian state sees threat everywhere; it is afraid 
of all power, indistinguishably confusing friend from foe. This is 
at least possible given Mobutu’s lineage of division, corruption, 
and antagonism, which, while succeeding in preserving its own 
existence, simultaneously bled itself to debilitation. Or in more 
recent context, Kabila (the father) refusing foreign observers into 
his country to see how genocidal his presidential march really was. 
This same Kabila, the forty-year communist rebel at the state’s 
periphery turned tyrant in Kinshasa, was gunned down four years 
into office by his most trusted allies, the Kadogo youth. 
At it’s most basic, photography is time and place, a record 
of a particular world. A negation of this common grounding is 
a negation of objective reality. Without the objects that form a 
common relation between and beyond people, collective life is 
reduced to a scattering of private subjects. Symbolically, the space 
of appearance — the public realm —collapses. In any case, the 
people don’t like it either. And I am not sure why.
1.1
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This evening, having depleted my regular stock of bananas, 
avocados, and bread, I went out in search of dinner. Some 
unknown chest condition causing crushing pain when I swallow 
leaves me reduced to light or liquid fare. There are bright neon 
lights in dark back-alley bars, and the dull nausea of fluorescents 
in Lebanese-owned late-night groceries. It is eleven pm and the 
district doesn’t offer prepared and cheap food. People are around 
on the vast boulevard, but cheap food is not. Coming out from 
dark streets, I see the Hotel Memling as a spectacular thing at this 
hour. In the unflattering and undiscerning evenness of sunlight it 
seems more like an overweight 50’s socialite than a modern luxury. 
Where the modern image cannot be preserved structurally, it is at 
least done symbolically. Here, foreign dollars are converted into 
generators and once again into watts. With this magic trick the 
hotel lobby and adjacent plaza is unusually vital. Across the street 
there’s an expensive pizza joint and another chicken restaurant. 
Both places are sanitary, a copy of western fast-food decorum with 
a slew of young Congolese and the occasional Mzungu clientele. 
My equivalent of one or two USD wont go far; prices are western, 
not Fufu. Heading further north a foul-breathed man of my age 
and build hustles up behind me, throwing an arm over my shoulder. 
“Hello my friend”, we start. “What’s your name?” With inane 
humor. “Where’s the rest of this drink for me, my friend?” The two 
of us just strolling down the blank street, my companion insisting 
over and over he’s going to knife me for my money. At first it’s 
scary, but nothing happens, it becomes just a stupid conversation. 
First, I have no money on me; though that doesn’t make any real 
difference to his threats. Second, he just repeats the same words 
to me.  Maybe this impotence is the result of a drunken nervous 
system switchman confusing the call for action with bland speech. 
He holds my shoulder the whole way. Drinking has clearly not 
sapped his strength. It seems he just wants to threaten this white 
1.2
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stranger, a joke of bravado. Near the end of the street he hasn’t 
knifed me yet, nor have I seen anyone around to make sense of 
what is happening. We are in our own little world, like a suspended 
form of absence, a null danger in a null space. He says, “My friends 
are at the bar up ahead. We are going to really fuck you up.” 
Well. Clearly there’s no point in sticking around to discover the 
truth of this enterprising ambition.
1.3
Building on King Leopold II’s exploitation of ivory and rubber 
under the penal colony in 1885, in the Congo Free State, Belgium’s 
colonial possession in 1959 would come to produce 10% of the 
world’s copper, 50% of its cobalt and some 70% of its industrial 
diamonds.1 When the Belgians left the Congo in 1960, King 
Baudouin’s departing speech used the infrastructural development 
tied to extraction as a rhetorical device to aggrandize the civilizing 
accomplishments of colonial rule. By the date of independence, 
rail networks joined the mineral rich southeast to Stanleyville 
port in the middle of the jungle and the capital city Leopoldville, 
road networks crossed national and transnational territories, 
while primary schools and church hospitals proliferated in small 
and large towns alike. The Congo’s first prime-minister, Patrice 
Lumumba, was not welcome to speak at Baudouin’s ceremony, 
but did so anyways. He argued, the nature of development 
(infrastructural or cultural) did not root itself in the betterment of 
the Congolese people, just as colonial law did not exists to preserve 
the harmony of the Congolese society. The two orders, he claimed, 
represented nothing greater than the material and supra-structural 
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arms of the colonial apparatus, whose function centered on 
natural resource extraction. Crop production was enforced. Roads 
were maintained for mines. The chimera of education produced 
nothing greater than a servile, impotent mass.2 With access to 
the means of production or self-direction actively suppressed 
through exclusion, the colonial civilizing mission never wanted to 
ameliorate the living standards of the colonized; to do so would 
threaten the legitimacy of their rule. 
The Congolese had no political voice, no rights to own land or to travel 
freely. They were subject to curfews in urban areas, in rural areas, to forced 
labour.  Though primary schools abounded, there was no higher education 
available except in Catholic seminaries. Nor were students allowed to study 
in Belgium.3
The obfuscating principle of development meant that as a moral 
imperative, colonial intervention had no need for reciprocal 
political involvement from the Congolese. 
In other words, up until 1959, political rights did not need to 
exist so long as the colonial subject was socially and economically 
supported.4
1.4
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It’s a gated compound like many others, differentiated by the large 
number of people both inside and out. There is a cathedral at the 
north entrance, set in a grove-like serenity. Those congregational 
members not singing inside are strolling around outside in 
practical silence. Outside the front gate, hectic crowds eddy in the 
confluence of two major streets, two compounds, a large public 
square, and a little further away, the train station and the American 
embassy. 
The only other people staying in the hotel are two women, both 
American, and both Christian. They are here to pick up a child 
they chose to bring back to the States. There is a meeting going 
on at the bar with an adoption agency’s representative, one of the 
American ladies, and her partner. She is cradling the baby and 
not paying much attention to the Congolese man. Earlier today, 
the younger lady recounted to me the whole gamut of adoption 
agencies she had to choose from, all with their own particularities, 
not all trustworthy or good. She tells me she is flying her baby 
home tomorrow. For medical purposes they are flying first class. 
5000 USD of luxury for a child when less then 10 cents US buys 
a bushel of bananas. Slippery slope, I guess. When she speaks, she 
reminds me of what Romeo Dallaire wrote of his experience in 
Rwanda, the difference in their situations clearly differentiating 
the two sets of parents, nevertheless… 
Before I had held this boy, I had agreed with the aid workers and 
representatives of  both the warring armies that I would not permit 
any exporting of  Rwandan orphans to foreign places. When con-
fronted by such requests from humanitarian organizations, I would 
argue that the money to move a hundred kids by plane to France 
or Belgium could help build, staff  and sustain Rwandan orphan-
ages that could house three thousand children. This one boy eradi-
cated all my arguments. I could see myself  arriving at the terminal in 
Montreal like a latter-day St. Christopher with the boy cradled in my 
arms, and my wife, Beth, there ready to embrace him.1
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At the prospect of political participation in the late 1950’s, a 
profusion of largely tribal-based parties emerged. These ranged 
from wider pan-regional ethnic groupings to the otherwise 
smaller groups, of limited local-importance only.  Only the MNC 
(Mouvement National Congolais) of Patrice Lumumba, and 
Albert Kalonji who split from the MNC, emerged as national 
entities. In Congo’s richest province of Katanga, where large 
copper extracting operations were located, the Lunda-dominated 
Conkat party favored independence for itself. Led by Moise 
Tshombe, the province had strong ties to Belgian, British and 
American companies. Politically, the Conkat party strongly 
advocated continued ties with Belgium.1
Unlike the French in Algiers and West Africa, the Belgian 
overseers were not interested in a protracted colonial war, 
allowing independence movements to progress relatively quickly. 
After Lumumba’s arrest, and wide-spread national violence 
demanding independence, the Belgians largely gambled on a form 
of soft withdrawal, whereby political and economic links would 
remain, tying the new administration to Belgium. Having already 
obfuscated the means of state control, they naively assumed that 
their monopoly on skill and the strangulation of economic means 
would require the elected government to remain dependent on 
colonial skill to fulfill top administrative, military and business 
roles.
[At independence] No national or even provincial elections had ever been 
held.  The lack of skilled personnel was acute.  In the top ranks of the civil 
service no more than three Congolese out of an establishment of 1,400 
held posts and two of those were recent appointments.  By 1960 the sum 
total of university graduates was thirty.  Indeed, the largest complement of 
trained manpower were priests: of those there were more than six hundred. 
At the end of the 1959-1960 academic year, only 136 children completed 
secondary education. There were no Congolese doctors, no secondary 
1.5
21 PART I: KINSHASA
school teachers, no army officers. The first contingent of Congolese officer 
cadets to be sent for training in Belgium was not due to return until 1963.2
Functionally, this self-importance was true, though not accepted. 
Moderate parties sympathetic to the colonists lost heavily in the 
national elections of 1960, such that with independence on 30th of 
June 1960, Lumumba’s MNC held the majority, with 26% of the 
vote. With key areas remained outside of his control however, — 
Katanga (the nation’s wealth) and Kinshasha (the nation’s évolues), 
— he was forced to form a fragile coalition with 12 other parties.3
Even before Congolese independence, the U.S. Government 
attempted to ensure the election of a pro-Western Congolese 
government by supporting sympathetic leaders. In a cable written 
on April 18 1960, a month before the elections, the CIA Africa 
Division Chief Tweedy wrote, “We are not opposed to giving 
discreet support (provided it is not attributable to the United 
States Government) to a limited number of candidates if specific 
justification is provided in each case.”4 Further, “we are opposed to 
any ‘stop Lumumba’ campaign. He is one of the few, if not only, 
Congolese leaders with a Congo-wide appeal and standing.”5 
Largely this is stated not for their particular sympathy towards 
a leader of national importance, but rather the realization that 
an overtly American-backed “anti-Lumumba campaign could 
backfire.”6
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One thing I have noticed, walking around, is that there is a near-
universal phenomenon almost completely absent in Kinshasa. 
The DRC ranks as one of the poorest countries in the world, but 
22TOO MUCH TIME, OR TOO LITTLE
there are few people begging, or at least begging with irrefutable 
insistence. Not that I care much; it simply runs against the current 
of much of my experience.  For example, when last in Africa, in 
West Africa, particularly Ghana, it was not unheard of to have the 
pejorative ‘racist’ leveled at you for turning down a ‘free gift’ or 
not buying a completely useless object (like a car part for my non-
existent 4x4). 
I suppose the cultural, economic, or customary variability 
between these two regions would render any comparison difficult. 
However, Ghana has a much stronger western presence. Young 
travellers, NGO workers, missionaries, football coaches, all visit 
the Kenya-of-the-west. Kinshasa has next to none of these carefree 
faces. Or at least not visibly so.  It would seem, quite apart from 
the lofty sentiment of inclusion and exposure, one of the effects of 
tourism is to reinforce difference. The more the variety of human 
interaction is reduced to a singular marker (tourist, aid-worker, 
missionary), the nuanced differences between people are reduced 
to signified roles.  The more pressure applied, the sharper the 
category of means/ends is set. 
When sending in an application for a Congolese tourist visa, one 
is required to show the usual proof of subsistence, itinerary, yellow 
fever vaccination record, and employment letter. In addition, you 
are required to have a letter of reference, and a hotel reservation 
or letter of invitation from a local signed by the police. The only 
hotels that I can find are what guidebooks tell me are ‘luxury’ 
hotels, at 100$ or more a night. Some, 300-400$. It is simpler and 
cheaper to ‘shop’ a reservation and get on with it. The cost of the 
visa itself is 300 USD, allowing a single entry of 3 months duration. 
There is no tourist draw to the Congo. There are businessmen and 
bureaucracies. Those that go, are sent. The Kin-la-belle economy is 
run on expense accounts.
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What would follow in the wake of the disastrous start to post-
colonial Congo would be both a continuation of exploitation 
coupled with acute political suppression: the binding of post-
colonial Congolese hands, much the same as colonialism. The 
Congo Crisis, as it has come to be known, started immediately 
after independence on June 30th, 1960, and lasting until Mobutu’s 
second coup of 1965. The Crisis outwardly unfolded as a series of 
events, inconspicuously reduced to the incompetence of national 
political process. Quite apart from this, in crisis the Congo 
experienced a tourniquet of extra-national political contestants: 
newly minted UN brigades, Belgian soldiers, American diplomats, 
Soviet Union ordinance and Chinese propaganda. 
On the fifth of  July 1960 — within the first few days of  
independence — the army mutinied. In the transference of  
power that saw many Congolese urban elites gain access to 
state wealth, many in the army resented their lack of  social 
mobility. Unlike the state, which was now in the hands of  
nationals, the army remained largely run by an eleven hundred 
strong officer corps of  Belgians. A purported insult by then-
commander General Emile Janssens —“before independence 
= after independence”1 — re-affirmed for the Africans that 
the authorities would not readily permit ‘africanization’. With 
the demand for his resignation turning into riots, this violence 
spread to other garrisons, and aggression soon turned towards 
the 100 000 European civilian population, causing a mass 
exodus. This white flight, in turn, fuelled a massive shortage 
of  skilled workers. In reaction to the riots, Lumumba opted to 
replace the entire army officer class with nationals, appointing 
Victor Lundula as army commander, and his trusted personal 
aide, Joseph Mobutu, as his Chief  of  Staff. Like Lumumba in 
the civil service, Mobutu’s rank of  sergeant-major had been the 
highest rank attained by a national during colonial rule. 
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Reaction to the continued mutiny proceeded in a tit-for-tat 
process of  consolidation of  control. 
The Belgian government at first tried to persuade Lumumba to permit 
Belgian troops stationed in the Congo to restore order, but when Lumumba 
refused it, it unilaterally orders Belgian troops into action and arranged to 
fly in reinforcements. As Belgian troops took control of key points like 
Leopoldville airport, Lumumba became convinced that Belgium was trying 
to re-impose its rule. He broke off diplomatic relations and declared that, as 
far as he was concerned, the Congo was now at war with Belgium.2
On the 11th of July, the mineral rich state of Katanga, under the 
leadership of Moise Tschombe, seized on the growing chaos in the 
country by announced its secession from the Congolese state. The 
Belgians in Katanga actively disarmed Congolese troops, while 
training local Katangan soldiers. 
This show of  force helped ensure the continued stability of  
the mining sector while maintaining a political base within the 
country.
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Flying into Kinshasa, DRC at night – having passed through 
Brussels, Belgium, at mid-day – is flatly unnerving. It is as if the 
security engendered by our technological suspension from the 
heavens belies the fact that I am looking at a city leveled by a great 
fire. Airport traffic control has denied us immediate landing, so we 
circle over Kinshasa in a wide arc. With an Angolan man, speaking 
in broken French and Portuguese, we passed the delay talking 
about chess. The plane has only a stopover in Kinshasa on its way 
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to the Angolan capital Luanda afterwards. Congo, I think, some 
5 million dead since the war started in 1996. Angola, I remember, 
and 25 years of protracted and horrific civil war. It seems more 
like the city has been on fire, the last fuels consumed in a waste 
of darkness. It is not the bright glow of a million city lights, but 
what an imagined Hamburg or Dresden must have looked like. 
Maybe though, the televised image projects the heart of darkness. 
The unease I have is that of a colonist about to land in the colonial 
outpost. 
The airplane really should have cranked up its heat before 
landing. The tropical heat and humidity is so foreign to the frigid 
cabin that it disorients you in first steps on the tarmac. It didn’t 
help any that, added to this discomfort, I was experiencing a 
general fear, having little understanding of where I was or where I 
wanted to be. Inside the small terminal building, I first asked my 
yellow-fever-vaccine-check lady if she knew how to get into town, 
or, where I should stay. If I waited for her to finish her shift she’d 
drive me in for 60 USD, and we’d take it from there. I was not 
overly impressed with this quote (which was the same as the taxis 
outside) so I craned over the baggage room with hopes of finding 
the other westerners I had seen on the plane. Apart from a rough 
looking French man, the best option seemed to be an older lady 
who, at first glance, looked like she might have spent her youth 
aligning her sympathies with the free-spirited war-resistance, but 
who now worked for USAID. We had a lovely chat, but ultimately 
unproductive; company policy banned non-staff occupancy of 
staff vehicles. I waited for my bag in the dim room, and decided to 
walk into town rather than pay the tourist fare asked by taxis and 
yellow fever vaccination program ladies. In hindsight this would 
have been a terrible idea. Not the least of reasons being the airport 
is twenty kilometers from town, and worse, it was midnight. My 
USAID friend however talked to her driver, who then caught me 
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Ed is an older man, a doctor, and he’s travelling central Africa 
with Sally, a younger Anglo/Aussie. Ed today, this afternoon to be 
precise, was walking down the main drag of Kinshasa, Le 30 Juin. 
This is ostensibly the main boulevard of town. It is wide, wider 
than any traffic needs it to be, or at least until a military parade 
roles out. It is busy, though at its odd scale, objects float in space, 
rather than occupy it. Most of the way down its long reach there 
are few people walking, though plenty enough in vehicles and 
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by the shoulder and informed me that the fellow to my right was 
a driver for an abbey-cum-hotel in town. Well, I’ll be damned. I 
tucked in behind the original party going to Procure St. Anne (a 
mzungu and his younger African partner) while our escort weaved 
a path through the bribe-hungry army and police. 
The French expat I followed into town last night has left. While 
talking to him on the ride in, he had mentioned a curious social 
prejudice favoring the Congolese over the Rwandans. His partner, 
who may have been either, made no protest to this stereotyping. 
The Congolese are like the Italians, amicable and frank. The 
Rwandans, are more like the Swiss, reticent and formal.
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shops. As expected for a main drag of colonial lineage, it retains 
much of its wealth and status. The Lebanese have their miniatures 
of the global north. Foreign-financed office towers stand proud. 
Rich hotels stockpile the necessary opulence for their enclaved 
businessmen. With airline offices on the boulevard, the bird-song 
of poverty — to the few broken from it’s cage — promise Eden in 
the form of the European Union. 
While Ed was out walking, bearing towards the grocery 
store, a police officer approached him. The man asked for Ed’s 
identification, so Ed gave his photocopies. These were insufficient. 
Ed then asked to see the man’s badge, which he provided. As Ed 
pulled out his real passport from his money belt concealed in his 
pants, another man took him from behind and pushed him into 
the back of their car. A bag was placed over his head and a gun 
pushed to his temple. He was then freed of his money. Some 2000 
USD. He says later he had such a large sum because he was unsure 
of how money worked in the DRC (having just crossed over from 
the more stable Congo Republic). He says he was threatened 
repeatedly for being an American. Nothing, however, comes of it. 
Instead, he was driven around for an hour to an acceptable location 
and dumped. Nice enough that he was given back his visa and his 
passport, and most importantly, his life. 
Now I know. If a policeman looks legitimate, he very well 
might be. Legitimacy just means you get to carry a gun. Really, 
who is copying who in a criminal state? 
28TOO MUCH TIME, OR TOO LITTLE
Despite representing a neutral party, the UN entered into the 
Congo under the umbrella of realpolitik. In its attempt to remain 
apolitical, it succeeded in heavily aiding anti-Lumumbist elements 
(it was one). 
In the UN’s largest operation since its inception1 — under 
the local title ONUC (United Nations Operation in the Congo) 
— it responded to the crisis by initiating a rapid bi-directional 
intervention: first by airlifting a majority African peacekeeping 
brigade to the Congo, while secondarily, organizing a civilian task 
force to fill the administrative gap left by the chaos.2 For Lumumba, 
the largest threat to stability stemmed from the continued Belgian 
presence, which he claimed undermined his rule of a sovereign 
state. Not having control of his own army, he demanded the UN 
military peacekeepers be used to end both Belgian occupation, 
and Belgian orchestrated successions in Katanga and South-Kasai. 
Despite the UN’s position as an independent body, its bilateral 
relationship to the Americans (42% of ONUC’s funding was 
American3) meant ostensibly ‘neutral’ actions supported a ‘western’ 
agenda. Strategically, the Katanga succession was a critical source 
of revenue for the capital, so its loss accelerated national collapse. 
If, after the first two weeks of the Crisis, Belgian troops withdrew 
generally, they did not withdraw from Katanga. After the UN 
entered Katanga on August 12th 1960 (to remove Belgian military 
presence) Belgian military and political presence did not dissipate. 
To be sure, many of the paratroopers did not really leave the province, as 
some of them simply discarded their Belgian uniforms and wore the garb 
of the now defunct colonial military…The Belgian business interests, in 
close cooperation with the Belgian government, subsidised and supported 
the secessionist government; mercenaries and ‘volunteers’ were recruited in 
Europe (and later in southern Africa) to reinforce the Katangan gendarmerie 
and to maintain internal security in the province.4
Despite the UN affirming that the Katanga succession was an 
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internal affair, a UN document from October 1960 laid out 
the international nature of the succession: 
In Katanga, Belgian influence is omnipresent. Virtually all key 
civilian and security posts are either held directly by officials of 
Belgian nationality or controlled by advisors to recently appointed 
and often inexperienced Congolese officials.5
By middle August, having failed to garner UN support against 
the Katangan and South-Kasaian successions, Lumumba 
appealed to the Soviets. The Americans would not risk the 
central African nation falling away from American influence. 
Prior to the introduction of the Soviets into the Congo, the 
Americans had largely hoped for an internal opposition to 
Lumumba. In a memo dated August 11th 1960, 
Reminding [Identity 1] and others that if they act prematurely it 
will give Lumumba opening to move against opposition, perhaps 
arresting leaders and or attempting eliminate senate. Also illegal 
overthrow would force hand United Nations.6
If the Soviets replaced the UN in the Congo, there existed 
two options for the Americans: Force the UN to stay in the 
Congo, or assassinate Lumumba.
President Eisenhower said that the possibility that the United 
Nations would be forced out was simply inconceivable, and declared 
that the United States should keep the United Nations in the Congo, 
even if it had to ask for European troops or if such action was used by 
the Soviets to start a fight.7
This is despite the fact that, “Hammarskjold and Ambassador 
Lodge doubted whether the United Nations could stay if the 
Congolese Government were opposed.”8
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I went looking for the Canadian Embassy this morning. The 
trip took me five kilometers east, to the edge of the rich district 
of Gombe. The government buildings, business offices and the 
expats are there. Walking around with my crumbling and pixelated 
Google-map, unsupported by street signs, I got quite lost, quite 
quickly. Given the monotony of walls and streets, people have very 
little geographic knowledge. Everything is behind a wall you can’t 
see over.
Street life here contrasts the moving and immobile city. In 
our cities, we westerners only see the moving city, the space of in-
between.  The idle men and women behind walls, drive the world 
of production and reproduction is private. Here of course, there 
are those behind walls, but only a few compared to the men and 
women on the streets plying their goods the informal market. The 
private realm here has expanded to fill the streets. Where I walk, 
there are a huge number of people whizzing around in chaos. Vans, 
taxis, SUV’s, even a pack of mzungus out for an afternoon jog. 
Against this, there are an even larger number of men and women 
sitting all day in silence and boredom, turned to stone by the sun, 
or by penury. Like the walls behind them, they sell what they can, 
but mostly they just sit and watch the city. With its extremely wide 
streets and leveled shoulders, these wealthy districts create a bizarre 
vacuum in space, deprived of meaningful density. It is reminiscent 
of the old stone forts; only here there are hundreds of them. Long 
walls and empty space. People are visible, bullets unobstructed. 
For a time I walk with a man I greet with a smile and ask for 
directions. He doesn’t know about what I’m asking because he’s 
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Lumumba’s invasion of Kasai was disastrous, with aggression towards 
the Baluba described by UN secretary-general Hammarskjold 
as having ‘the characteristics of the crime of genocide.’1 Despite 
Kasa-Vubu initially supporting Lumumba’s rejection of the 
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from the northern outskirts, but still, he greets me warmly and 
we talk for a time. With not much else to give distraction against 
the walls, we continue our conversation. For many reasons, this 
is not a simple conversation. The most obvious potential short-
circuit is the difference in our wealth. That is, it is the prejudice of 
the colonial legacy to think that every word spoken between the 
colonizer and the colonized would sublimate a truth whitewashed 
by cordiality. The second short-circuit is my particularly 
unprofitable French. It is clear however, and much to my surprise, 
neither issue takes shape. My communication, if not my language, 
is enough to engender understanding, and for what it is worth, he 
carries on with the discussion regardless of any particular moral 
or political justification to do otherwise. It is by and large a banal 
encounter. I suppose the hyper-activity of racism is defeated by the 
ordinary.
After four hours trying to find the embassy on foot, I settle for 
taking a shared taxi. Fifty cents later I am dropped off absolutely 
nowhere near the Canadian embassy. I do make it there eventually, 
but by the time I have walked another hour it is closed for the day. 
I tried, I figure, and they don’t really need to know I’m here. The 
taxi back along the great spinal avenue is sixty cents and I am home 
by six. 
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Belgians and acceptance of the Soviets, he announced on the 5th 
of September 1960 he was renouncing Lumumba. Lumumba in 
turn, renounced Kasa-Vubu. The political dead-lock was usurped 
by Mobutu’s first coup. Kasa-Vubu was re-instated as president 
while Lumumba was forced into hiding. American involvement 
up to this point remained covert, yet clear in its objectives. From 
a memo dated August 11, 1960, describing how to precipitate the 
fall of Lumumba: 
 Launch extensive [less than 1 line not declassified] campaign ([less than 1 
line not declassified] meetings) by assisting local political groups with the 
funds and guidance to take anti Commie line and oppose Lumumba
Cultivate and attempt recruit members current govt to keep foot in 
Lumumba camp. Although believe would be better oust him, do not want 
become tied irrevocably to opposition, if it not able achieve goals. Also 
would use such assets to try moderate Lumumba govt and obtain political 
intel.2
Kasa-Vubu’s Mobutu-derived, American-supported, coup of 
September 14th, 1960 was “coordinated with UNOC at highest 
levels here”.3 Americans did not content themselves with simple 
sponsorship, choosing instead to actively script actions for their 
national puppets. From a memo dated September 9th, 1960:
We [Department of State] are distressed at apparent inactivity Kasavubu 
at this crucial turning point…You should approach him soonest 
recommending in strongest terms he send message to SYG and publish 
same. Timing is crucial since Kasavubu’s message to SYG must be available 
before [Security Council] meeting, now scheduled Saturday a.m., Sept 10. 
Kasavubu should declare he is Chief of State and that he has, in accordance 
with legal procedures prescribed in “fundamental law” deposed Lumumba. 
Latter has no official status.4
Having understood Lumumba’s importance nationally, the 
Americans proposed his assignation. “To [Chief of Station] 
comment that Lumumba in opposition is almost as dangerous as 
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in office, [Identity 1] indicated understood and implied might 
physically eliminate Lumumba.”5
Despite the UN’s awareness and sympathy towards the coup, 
Hammarskjöld did not approve of the US/Belgian plan to 
assassinate Lumumba. Hammarskjöld had refused to allow the 
Congolese authorities to issue an arrest warrant for Lumumba, 
knowing the arrest was a pretense for his assassination. 
Lumumba was arrested on the third of December 1960, 
flown to Katanga on the 17th of January 1961, and murdered by a 
Belgian officer6, in the presence Katangan soldiers.
My hotel is next to the American Embassy, poised as ever in its 
swaddling bulwark.  Out front there are a number of UN vehicles, 
so I assume there’s a UN base nearby. Seeing the two parties 
side-by-side gives me a moment’s thought. Without question, 
the Americans overthrew the elected national government back 
in 1960. In a polemical cloak of necessary evil the Americans 
actively and illegally manipulated Congolese political sovereignty 
until, ultimately, they brought to power their kleptocrat-pawn 
and thug. With the criminal state established, the tyrant-puppet 
freely robbed his people with impunity. Tactics of divide and 
rule, though fragile, were protected against foreign and local 
threats alike by the Cold War benefactor. For 30 years, the tyrant 
retreated into isolation from his subjects. By fear and suspicion he 
isolated his subjects from each other. Plurality, or common trust, 
was rendered impotent. 
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Soon after Ed got mugged, I was out of money too. I knew the 
Congolese franc (CF) was next to useless (1 franc = .0011USD). 
What stood at independence as the second most industrialized 
African country had been decimated by kleptocracy and corruption 
until it fell into a tailspin. Inflation stood at 261% in 1990, then 
jumped to 6,800% by 1994. With war and modernization in 
parallel over the last twenty years, like Ed, I was unclear of what 
to expect once I had found a bank. To my amazement, in the 
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Tyranny destroys power. That is, until the fall of communism, 
when the eagle stopped keeping watch, and the old leopard had 
bled itself to starvation. With horrendous civil war forming in 
the emptiness of the state, what could resolve conflict with deep 
roots in post-colonial marginalization? American-backed, UN-
regulated, democracy.  This is known as a racket. 
And what should we make of the American and British 
allegiance to their new-generation of African neo-liberal leaders 
Rwanda and Uganda, ostensibly the chief suppliers of chaos 
and violence in the region? When you stand in front of the US 
embassy, and see the UN tanks, it is enough to give you pause. 
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middle of a traffic island I found a bank (later I found many), and 
outside the bank was a money-changer (which I also learned were 
everywhere). The bank, when prompted, dispensed completely 
immaculate US dollar bills. If it were not for the reputable name 
of the bank itself, I would have been certain these bills were fakes. 
Imagine going to the world’s poorest country, and seeing brand 
new, 20, 50, or 100 USD bills. It is like seeing a hummer in the 
middle of the jungle. And herein lies the problem. 
The DRC has a completely two-tier monetary system. 
Western goods are exchanged in USD, while Congolese goods 
are mostly exchanged in francs. And there is a big gap between 
them. An orange might cost 50 CF, but a cell phone will cost 30 
USD. In Kinshasa, the poor are poor, the seemingly non-existent 
middle class is skipped, and the rest of the market’s goods exist 
seamlessly in line with a shopping center in Brussels. In day-to-
day terms, this can be strikingly annoying. For example, no one 
in Kinshasa will accept bills with denominations lower than 20 
USD, and moreover, no one will accept any bills at all unless they 
are perfect: bends, dirt or rips are all cause for rejection. When 
discussed, the most common answer was that the measure existed 
for counterfeit prevention purposes. Why larger bills are exempt 
from this scrutiny, or why counterfeiters only make dirty bills is 
beyond me. If you want to buy anything less than 20 USD, you 
need francs. Congolese money comes in a huge range of next-
to-useless amounts; so converting 20 USD to francs produces a 
lot of francs. Most westerners will only see the higher range of 
these francs, 10CF, 20CF, 50CF and 100CF (1, 2, 5, and 10 US 
cents respectively). Thankfully, as of 2003 the larger 200 and 500 
CF are now printed and widely circulate (20 cents and 50 cents 
respectively). Congolese francs are some of the dirtiest pieces of 
paper one is likely to find.
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In a portentous beginning to nationhood, the protection of 
Mobutu against threats both internal and external, coupled with 
unaccountable support, set the condition of later impunity. With 
the steady construction of Mobutu as a turret on the margins of 
western civilization, it was clear that independence from western 
power did not equal the removal of western domination. Telegram 
from the Station in the Congo to the Central Intelligence Agency, 
Leopoldville, November 3, 1960:
Agree political realities require some form constitutionality for new govt. However if 
we to be realistic, must be satisfied with democratic facade as, with possible exception 
Nigeria, there no real democracy in Africa and Congolese are less prepared than most 
Africans for true democracy. We have alternatives between [Lumumba] dictatorship 
which would be anti-Western and pro-Western coalition which would try give Congo 
stable if not fully democratic govt.1
After Lumumba’s assassination, the Congo was split into four. 
In addition to the two secessionist movements, the Stanleyville 
government under Gizenga rivaled the Kinshasa government for 
legitimacy.  In the ensuing power struggle, the Americans quickly 
moved to coalesce support behind Mobutu, ending the Katanga 
succession and the Stanleyville (Gizenga) government. 
Despite earlier inaction on the part of the UN, the post-
Lumumba era saw the UN take an active role in Katanga. First, 
there was policing action. Belgian soldiers were arrested in 
September 19612. In August 1962, the Americans brought their 
might to bear on Tshombe and the UN.  “Tshombe... be advised 
privately that the U.S. will assign troops to UNOC unless Katanga 
comes to terms with the [Government of Congo] and submits 
to U.N. decisions.3 On the 21st of January 1963, the UN entered 
Katanga and ended the succession.4 
Despite American-backing, the ascension of ‘moderates’ to 
political supremacy was not forthright, causing the Americans 
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to fear the legal ascension of Gizenga (the heir to Lumumba’s 
political power, now located in the east). Discussions of Gizenga 
joining with the Kinshasa government were sabotaged, and he was 
arrested in 1962. The Americans next step was to cripple Gizenga’s 
political power.  
With G [Gizenga] immunity lifted, several courses action open to [Adoula, 
prime minister] and [Government of Congo], including: (a) Court trial 
and sentence. (b) Leave G alone as private citizen Leop area. (c) Banish G 
abroad or facilitate his legal departure (Cairo, Tanganyika, or elsewhere)—
medical treatment might be possible excuse. (d) Permit G “escape,” with 
familiar “Lumumba” consequences.5 
If the Stanleyville government lead by Gizenga was a political 
threat to American dominance in the Congo, the Mulelist uprising 
of 1964 threatened a military take-over. Pierre Mulele, and the 
‘Simba rebellion’ in Kwily and Kivu provinces, was a resurgence 
of Gizenga-based, Lumumba-inspired opposition. In response to 
the insurgency President Kasa-Vubu declared a state of emergency 
on the 21st, along with a re-insertion of Belgian mercenaries and 
American armor and funds. The rebellion was lost within a year. 
Recognizing the worthlessness of the ANC [Congolese National Army], 
Tshombe has brought back his ex-Katangan gendarmes from the bush and 
Angola. To be effective they would require white officers. Some mercenaries 
have already arrived in Leopoldville. While we wish Tshombe would choose 
mercenaries other than South Africans and Southern Rhodesians, who 
are unacceptable to other African states, to Tshombe they may represent 
the only immediately available resources to stiffen the gendarmes and the 
ANC.6
With elections providing a political deadlock in 1965, Kasavubu 
(acting president) and Tschombe (made prime-minister in a bid 
to re-unite the Congo) had arrived at an impasse. Despite popular 
support for Tschombe declining after the perceived failings of 
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the Simba rebellion, with Kasavubu proving similarly unpopular, 
Mobutu stated to his American handlers that he would not 
support Tshombe as president.7 With close consultation with the 
Americans, “Mobutu stressed he does not repeat not wish to stage 
another coup d’etat.”8 Three days later, on November 22 “[Mobutu] 
said he believes it imperative that he have funds at his disposition 
for passage to senior officers…Specifically he asked for CF thirty 
nine million”9. Mobutu led a bloodless coup on November 25, 
1965 with his funds approved on November 26, 1965. 
Walking away from the water and the wealth, the streets are not 
paved, and the buildings are much closer together. A collection of 
porous shacks have replaced the compounds of concrete in the rich 
district. There is no money for space or for privacy. The market I 
duck into after growing bored with the regular colonial grid is a 
collection of alleyways between shacks. Its stalls are covered with 
miles of blue tarp to protect against the rain and the sun. The mud 
floor is soaked, everything is dirty. Because of the density, the dirt, 
and the sealed enclosure, it also smells much worse than it should. 
‘Hi! My name is Ted’ reads the Home Depot t-shirt. Or how about 
Joe’s trucking from Nevada. The abundance of second-hand crap 
is astounding. It seems like everything is a hand-me down or an 
imported fake from china. 
On the way home I pass some expensive hotels and some bars. 
One of the bars is fairly empty but clearly a west-pat haunt. Drinks 
are some 15$. Needless to say I don’t stay long; yesterday I bought 
a Congolese Primus for 50 cents. I’ve heard rumors that of all the 
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business in the Congo, one of the few to survive all the wars and 
corruption has been this colonial era beer manufacturer.  
Before going home I get some dinner. Unhappily, there are very 
few street sellers with cooked food, plenty enough bananas and 
avocado though. From one lady I bought some 50 cents worth of 
beans. What followed was to me a queer ordeal. After asking if she 
minded if I stood there to eat, she looked at me strangely as if I 
had said something rude, talked with the other sellers for about a 
minute in lingala, then they all got up and left altogether, leaving 
me her seat. Unfortunately it looked like I had just taken over her 
stand; now here was a white man selling Maharagwe beans to 
passers-by. I ate my mountain of beans and went home. Thankfully 
there was no one around to buy beans from me. 
The Place du 30 Juin that bookends the axial boulevard is one 
of the few designated public spaces in Kinshasa. If south of the 
Boulevard is largely rich, and north is largely poor, the plaza is 
a sort of no mans land. It has its own mix of Congolese tourists, 
drunks, and military police, but it comes with a sterility that is 
uncommon. The 1939 King Albert of the Belgians monument 
stands at one end, clad in Chinese-sponsored white marble. The 
actual statue of King Albert fronting the monument was torn 
down long ago. The fountain in the middle is dry, but there is a 
slew of construction going on around it (purported to be a grand 
Emirate-based office/retail scheme to modernize the square). At 
the back of the plaza stands the Gare-central, designed by the same 
colonial architect as the Albert Monument. 
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1.17
Fearing what the Congolese nation might grow into, the Congo 
was forced into infantilism — slow motion economic collapse — 
and cradle-bound to a cold-war ideological time warp. The National 
Intelligence Estimate for the Congo, made on September 27th 
1968, described the economic situation bleakly: “due to “rebellion, 
civil disorder, and neglect…bridges were destroyed, equipment 
rusted, channels silted, and roads overgrown; reconstruction and 
repairs have been slow.”1 Agricultural production was “less than 
half the pre-independence level, with cotton, rice, and corn from 
small farms suffering the most.”2 In minerals, “the output of gold 
and tin suffered substantial losses. Diamond production was less 
affected, but a third of the output was smuggled out of the country, 
thus depriving the government of revenue.”3 Exports of copper, 
zinc, and cobalt from Katanga had been maintained at about 
pre-independence levels, but the price fell in 1968. Meanwhile, 
finances collapsed. “The country has been kept going only by the 
infusion of over $1 billion in economic and military assistance, 60 
percent of it from the US much of it through the UN.”4 American 
aid declined by 1968 having secured control for Mobutu. Aid 
levels for this time were $2.4 million in military assistance and $30 
million in economic aid, including $12 million in Food for Peace 
commodity aid.5
What runs through the history of CIA intervention in Congo 
during the Congo Crisis, apart from its stated Cold War security 
imperative, is the more steadfast commitment to the destruction 
of political autonomy and Congolese nationalism. Echoing this, 
the Belgians had no interest in Congolese political cohesion, 
resorting to factionalism to support its last claims to the mineral 
rich territory. Up until at least Mobutu’s second coup, the US gave 
unabated support to the Belgian’s colonial presence. Both actors 
lamented the lack of a national leadership, while simultaneously 
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propping up regional, tribal and patron networks. This is not to 
say that the interventionist forces were unaware of the conditions 
they were supporting. In a memo dated March third 1966 Mobutu 
is described as providing a “rudderless administration furnishing 
even less guidance and authority than heretofore.”6 lamenting his 
“gold bed syndrome” while he has “lost touch with reality and 
economics”, and “risen in souffle like grandiloquence.”7 Despite 
this, Mobutu received international aid for three generations. 
It was not until his wider geo-political usefulness had expired 
at the end of the Cold War, that his patron network collapsed. 
1.18
Flying out of Kinshasa is a lot more difficult than I had imagined. 
The required sequence of actions are completely obfuscated and 
unmarked. I didn’t asked my driver for help, but his immediate 
responsiveness to my directional blunders made it clear he regularly 
led salmon up stream. After getting out of the van and heading for 
the wrong building entirely, he set me straight. 
First, I had to find my way to the back of the main building 
(which to most of us would seem like the loading dock), where, 
in one large room packed with people I found tucked away in 
the corner, a kiosk selling 5 USD travel permits. After getting 
my bags weighed and inspected from one gentleman in civilian 
clothes lounging in the middle of the room, another gentleman 
checked them at the back. And finally after buying myself customs 
clearance from another man in a tucked away office for some 10 
USD (this extortion paid for with my most uselessly dirty, ripped 
bill in exchange for a stamp, a frown and some words) I was ready 
to board my plane to Goma. 
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Hey brother,
If permitted, I’d like to tell you a story about last night. It is simple enough 
so I will shape it simply; what I have heard, what I saw, what I did, what 
I thought. 
Prologue. My time here has been filled with countless stories about the 
corruption of order, crippled further by the absence of the rule of law.  An 
Indian man who runs the restaurant I frequent says that he has been robbed 
by armed thugs three times in the last year. If there is no other recourse for 
protection, I ask, why he doesn’t get a gun for self-defense? He says, “no, no, 
sir... please.. listen to me...if you go and get a gun, no-one will protect you, 
they will put you in jail. There is no law of self-defense, you as a westerner 
have no rights here in the Congo.” The reports I read from Human Rights 
Watch (HRW) and the UN all attest to the impudence that comes from 
clientaliste networks. Judges are bought over cases of murder, allegiances 
and social contract hold only so long as they are individually useful, and the 
police and military move with impunity. There is effectively no universal 
‘law’; you just cooperate as best you can.
2.1
2.2
Act One. I was out running again last night. I’ve started doing this 
since arriving in Goma. It helps me in a few ways. It is novel, a surreal 
experience of the other side of city life. It lets me see the city empty, its bones 
laid bare. Also, I would feel a little too bougie running during the day. On 
this particular night I was at the compound of a group of NGO’s. Brilliantly 
friendly group. In a simple room like any other room back home, with its 
familiar bright lights, white tiled floor, large tv and couches, we drank and 
learned to tango. By 11:30pm I had walked home, changed, and left my 
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hotel. I had to wake the doorman up unfortunately, who winced at having 
to face the giant steel door again, while questioning where I was going at 
this hour. It is worth mentioning that every muzungu has warned me how 
bad an idea it is to go out at night. Not just night. I have been warned 
repeatedly that the area my hotel is in is not safe at any time of day. Yes. Yes. 
Thank you, I say. You see, here, every white person is attached at the hip to 
an NGO, or the UN. And so they have curfews that regulate their behavior 
temporally, and a ban on leaving their vehicle, regulating their behavior 
spatially. Day and night they drive everywhere in their big white SUV’s 
and only get out at the store or behind a military-grade wall. I think, it is in 
their insular comfort, many are just afraid of what they can’t even do (that 
is, be physically present in the city).
I run as I run many times before. And it is a beautiful night.  About 
two kilometers in I meet two youths clamoring while running after me, 
but I outsprint them. No idea what they want, but I don’t stop to ask. 
Nevertheless, it is not a good omen. Generally while out running, I take 
one of about three or four main routes; the options are fairly limited with 
an international border to the east, a lake to the south and a mountain to 
the northwest.  So options are either north towards the rebels, or west out 
of town. In all of them, the streets start safe (my words), and get rougher 
and rougher closer to the edge of town.  There are lights all night in the 
main streets, with a smattering of noise from the nightclubs; otherwise all 
the shops are closed. The roads start paved and lit, but soon turn to dirt and 
dark. Usually there is no one around, maybe the occasional taxi motorcycle, 
or UN patrol vehicle. Very infrequently, a sprinkle of bars are still open. 
When they see this shirtless muzungu run past they cheer like they have just 
seen a pig fly. Largely however, in Goma after dark, no one is in the streets 
and that suits me just fine. 
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After Belgium took over ownership of Ruanda-Urundi in 1922, a 
socio-economic solution was found to fill the need for both cheap 
labor in fertile Kivu province, and overpopulation in Rwanda. 
By the 1930’s the vast resettlement scheme labeled the Mission 
Immigration Banyarwanda (MIB), brought scores of largely 
Hutu laborers and Tutsi chiefs to work Belgian plantations. In 
accommodating the influx, the Belgians did not displace the 
indigenous Hunde population from the area, but instead created 
an enclaved chiefdom within the traditional Hunde territory. By 
independence, the population of Banyarwanda (Hutu and Tutsi 
from Rwanda) would outnumber the local Hunde population by 
as much as ten to one in Rutshuru, and three to one in Masisi.1 
The next wave of Banyarwandans into the Kivus’ would consist 
of largely Tutsi elites fleeing political persecution from the Hutu 
revolution in Rwanda. Unlike the Hutu workers of the MIB, 
the so-called 59’ers were able to bring with them considerable 
social and economic capital.  Most importantly, they had access 
to a state patron network through their leading émigré patron, 
Barthélemy Bisengimana. A Congolese Tutsi, and Mobutu’s chief 
of staff, Bisengimana was closely connected to state power. The 
process of land accumulation for the Banyarwanda was started, 
through Bisengimana, by political patronage and furthered by 
2.3
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It is two weeks ago (27 August, 2013) that the mortars shells hit the 
city, so the people of Goma, fed up with UN passivity, organized 
to rally against them. I was not in the territory yet, so I missed the 
events first hand. Instead, I hear about them through Aden, a UN 
employee. He claims that as thousands marched the main road to 
the airport, his vehicles were pelted with stones and one set on fire. 
Leaving the vehicles was not an option, the protective space being 
their only safety. In fact, two Congolese did die in the protests. In 
attempts to pacify the crowd, UN fired rubber bullets, while the 
Police fired live rounds.
M23, the predominatly Tutsi rebel group, was responsible 
for the shelling of residential Goma. Once again, the Rwandan- 
sponsored war-machine was threatening to take the capital of 
2.4
bribery. In 1966 the Bakajika law converted all public land to 
the state, while in 1973 Zairianization measures under Mobutu 
seized Belgian property for the state.2 In addition to inheriting 
former Belgian plantation, the new laws of 1973 effectively ended 
customary indigenous and peasant land rights, granting greater 
access to wealth for those connected to the state apparatus.3 
Large land concessions, often stolen, were handed over to Tutsi 
and Hunde chiefs. Seen as ‘foreigners’ by ‘local’ tribes, the greatest 
threat to Banyarwanda land claims acquisitions was their right 
to citizenship. In order to ensure the Banyarwanda were legally 
protected, Bisengimana brought about legislation in 1971 granting 
citizenship to those who arrived in the Congo before June 30, 
1960. In 1972, the date was scaled back to January 1, 1950.4
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North Kivu province. They last took the city on the 19th of 
November 2012; this time from not twenty kilometers out. The 
hydra-headed beast of the Congo-Wars-cum-Kivu-Conflict last 
took the city in 2012, displacing thousands. For years, in response 
to war and the threat of war, there have been two armies in the 
city, the UN and the Congolese. The UN, under the local title 
MONUC (United Nations Mission in the Democratic Republic 
of Congo) — later changed to MONUSCO in 2010 (United 
Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic 
Republic of the Congo) — originally existed in order to maintain 
peace, but was helpless to enforce it. The current situation having 
been framed by the UN not as ‘war’ but as a ‘post conflict’ peace 
(disturbed by spoilers) furthered policies of non-intervention. 
Meanwhile, the Congolese national army — as acting sovereign 
— had always held, at best, a tenuous grasp of the fringe territory 
from its far-flung reaches of Kinshasa. On 28 March 2013, a three 
thousand strong Tanzanian /South-African / Malawian subgroup 
of the MONUSCO mission was given orders by the United 
Nations chapter VII mandate to take an active role in bringing 
stability to the region. This was the second time in the Congo 
(after the first mandate on 24 February 2000) that the order was 
given by the security council, to not simply protect civilians and 
promote peaceful diplomacy, but search for, and engage rebel 
entities. With or without the Congolese army present, the UN 
could attack those that threated peace in the area.  
It is the fact that M23 was still at the gates that angered the 
Congolese of Goma.
50TOO MUCH TIME, OR TOO LITTLE
I arrived in Goma from Kinshasa at midday. Despite the ongoing 
war there is nothing remarkable about the airport. Outside, the 
near-atrophied carcass of a DC-3 (it overshot the runway in 
2008) is comical, more from its witness of the destructiveness 
of ineptitude than violence. The yellow vaccine lady tasked with 
checking to see if you are bringing yellow fever into the country 
stole my vaccination card and then claimed it was lost. She would 
find it for me if I gave her incentive to do so. I did not think it 
was necessary to find something whose whereabouts was already 
known, so I declined to pay the search party. The silliness was 
mutually mocked, so with some affection it was given back. Then 
they lost my bag. This was mostly unfortunate; my seatmate, 
a soft-spoken Congolese man named Joseph, a local to Goma, 
and professor at the university, had insisted on finding me 
accommodation. Making him wait on the other side of the airport 
doors felt ungrateful. My bag, and those of a smattering of others, 
showed up a half hour later.  Nothing had gone missing. 
Once I got out of the building, I found him still waiting for me 
with his son and wife, and their large SUV. When I mentioned my 
plan — pitching my tent in the front lawn of the cheapest hotel in 
town for 4 USD a night — he was shocked, and visibly appalled. 
They didn’t personally know of any hotels, so they contacted 
several people to find a suitable establishment. I had no idea what 
2.5
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seemed reasonable to them, but this did not matter: it was decided 
that I should stay at the Hotel Versaille. In the end we are only in 
the car for a minute because the hotel is right off of the main road 
to the airport. It was safe and clean, they insisted. My personal 
preference, unanimously denounced, was unsuitably contaminated 
with prostitutes and unfavorables.  My claims that I did not mind, 
given the price was reasonable was more confounding. There is a 
general and immutable idea western people are all wealthy. Any 
claims otherwise are simply ignored. Understandably. However, I 
was not too fond of spending money for appearance sake.  
2.6
Much like a motel, the hotel Versaille has two levels of rooms. The 
sunken level where I have a room, among ten identical others, is 
15 USD a day. It is a white room (that rains dirt from the ceiling) 
about as small as the things contained in it would allow: a sink, 
toilet and cold shower, a desk and a bed. There is a plastic chair out 
front. It has water rarely, and electricity even more rarely. Upstairs, 
the expensive rooms have a large front glass entrance but what 
more, I’m not too sure. There is no-one downstairs, except me, 
and only one occupant upstairs, having rather loud, and publicly-
visible sex. The professor bartered the price for me. And once he 
and his family left, I was taken on a tour of the compound. For 
hotel patron security, the front gate is an oversized steel wall, which 
leaves the porter in dread of opening it.  Cars regularly honk for 
five minutes (assuring the doorman’s interest) before he decides 
it is worth investigating.  A room not six feet square serves as the 
front office. A thatched-roof restaurant is tucked away on one side 
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2.7
This afternoon, over lunch, I sat with Aden for three hours. I had 
a large local beer every hour, chicken curry and four samosas. 
Aden had seven or eight beers, and chain-smoked. Aden is a 
kindly man who prefers no company to idle chatter, and seems 
to have replaced solid food with alcohol and cigarettes. He is an 
ex-German sergeant who did two tours of Afghanistan and now 
works with the UN. Of the many topics covered over lunch, one 
was prostitution; Aden explained, within the UN, the practice 
was more prevalent than reasonable expectation might reckon. 
Be careful, he suggested, these Congolese women are crafty. He 
of the front parking lot. In the middle, a green lawn is decorated 
with a smattering of chairs and tables. An open-air bar is located 
at the other end. Fairly early on, the cook of the restaurant decided 
he wanted to be my friend, and so did the cleaner, the barman, the 
doorkeeper, and the office attendant. It struck me that there were 
a lot of staff for very few patrons. 
Later I learn that the hotel is a favorite haunt of the Congolese 
military in the region. They all ride forest green Toyota pick-up 
trucks, retrofitted so the box has two facing benches where 8 or so 
soldiers sit with legs dangling out. A central turret-mounted heavy 
machine gun stands positioned right behind the rear glass. When 
they come by the truckload, these soldiers park their vehicles 
in the front lawn and the men pile out for their R and R. These 
Congolese soldiers are a particularly unfortunate set of neighbors 
to enjoy a nighttime drink with; they come in bands of fifteen to 
twenty, drink excessively, and carry extremely big guns.
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had arranged a fee with one prostitute, say, 20 USD. Afterwards, 
to his great indignation, the same lady demanded twice or triple 
the price. The ploy? If he didn’t meet this new fee, she would 
go to the police, followed by his UN commanders, and claim 
that she was raped. An amazing reversal of power, I tell him. He 
continues his warning; a few months ago a prostitute claimed she 
was pregnant. Aden faced this accusation with the responsibility 
appropriate to its gravity. Despite being petrified, he was ready to 
take action. So (not trusting anyone else) he took her to see the 
UN doctor. Behind the doctor’s closed doors, with stained face 
she pleaded with him to fake the test; she needed the money more 
than him. Aden’s friend, who had a similar experience, was told 
that his prostitute had attempted to switch the urine samples. For 
Aden, 400USD was the paternal child-support cost quoted by the 
prostitute. 
It goes to figure; there is never an invasion without a counter-
invasion. 
 
Since the M23 rebels were repulsed from the outskirts of Goma 
last month by the UN expeditionary force MONUSCO, the city 
appears normal. The mortars that hit the city are not visible, and 
I can see no physical traces of war. Not 2013, 2008, 2004, 2001, 
1998, 1996, or 1995 and so on.  I am told the UN curfew has been 
rolled back from nine pm to  ten pm. NGO’s have a similar easing 
of preventive measures.
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L A  D A N S E  M A C A B R E
 KING LEOPOLD II : “STOP! STOP! I AM TIRED
 DEATH : “I STARTED AT YOUR BIDDING, I STOP WHEN I CHOOSE”
[Fig. 2.4] 
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The first instance of anti-foreigner violence in post-independent 
Kivus would erupt in 1963, centering around the Masisi 
territory.  For three years the “Kanyarwanda war” consisted of 
a large-scale massacre of Hutu and Tutsi by an alliance of local 
elements, the Hunde and the Nande.  Its point of departure was 
the creation of the tripartite Kivu province (Nord-Kivu, Sud-
Kivu, and Maniema). Of central concern, Hunde tribes feared 
the appropriation of political institutions by the Banyarwanda. 
In order to justify the violence, the rhetorical tool of legitimized 
exclusion was developed. By casting the Banyrwanda as outsiders, 
the ‘indegenous’ tribes sought to revoke their right to exist in the 
Congo. According to René Lemarchand in his book The Dynamics 
of Violence in Central Africa
One of the first moves of the Hunde insurgents, according to one observer, 
was to reduce to ashes the local administrative archives so as to prevent the 
identification of the Banyarwanda otherwise than as refugees or foreigners.1
In 1977 Mobutu expelled Bisengimana under still-unknown 
circumstances, causing the political big-man network of the 
Banyarwanda to collapse. The inability to pressure the central 
government ushered in an era of anti-foreign rhetoric and 
ultimately, violence. Bisengimana’s laws were repealed. By 1981, 
the legislative council retrograded the date for nationality to 
October 19, 1908. Not only did this threaten ‘recent’ migrants 
(those of the MIB, and the so called 59’ers) it created a pretense for 
wider exclusion, particularly towards the Congolese Tutsi known 
as the Banyamulenge.  By pushing the burden of proof beyond the 
means of the minorities, the new law would have provided state-
sanctioned backing for indiscriminate persecution. Despite the 
fact that the de jure implementation of the law was never achieved, 
anti-‘foreigner’ propaganda proliferated in the post-Bisengamana 
era.  
The vulnerability of the Banyarwanda was exacerbated by the 
2.8
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collapse of Congolese economy in the early 1990’s. With resource 
scarcity and unemployment in Masisi, violence against ‘foreigners’ 
(Hutu and Tutsi) would see some 10,000 dead and 250,000 
displaced.2 
In the wake of the Rwandan Genocide in 1994, the vast waves 
of migrants from Rwanda would reconfigure the ethnic landscape 
in the Kivu’s. The addition of this third wave of migrants, from 
Rwanda, would be especially detrimental to the Banyamulenge. 
Fleeing political persecution in Rwanda, the Hutu organizers of the 
Rwandan genocide, (along with innocent Hutu), fled by the millions 
to refugee camps along the Congo-Rwanda border. The simplistic 
Hutu-Tutsi divide, so prevalent to post-genocide discourse, did 
not exist in the Congo prior to the 1994 genocide. With the influx 
of militant Hutu, the tribal landscape moved away from a Hutu/
Tutsi alliance against ‘indegenous’ elements, to a singling out of the 
Tutsi against the newly reconfigured Bantu ‘indegenous’ elements. 
The propaganda specifically targeted the Banyamulenge as a 
foreign menace, “…a Rwandan whose morphology and ideology 
is identical to that of Paul Kagame…”3 The law of April 28, 1995 
demanded the repatriation of “All Rwanda and Burundi refugees 
and immigrants, without condition and without delay,’ including 
the Banyamulenge, henceforth categorized as foreigners”.4
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I asked the professor’s wife about visiting refugee camps in the 
region. She advised that French wasn’t nearly as prevalent as it 
was in urban areas. In a sort of atavism, it is interesting how the 
colonial regime took hold of the country and stamped onto it a 
colonial infrastructure, culture and identity, but could only really 
smear it’s thin layer so far, not unlike the now eroded asphalt roads 
bandaged to the earth. It is interesting then that, like development, 
the colonial language also fissured and eroded, remaining intact 
only where concentrations of power were once dominant. Though 
French is widely spoken and officially the national language, 
local languages take primacy. This is especially apparent in the 
east, where Swahili links the DRC to its eastern trading partners 
Uganda, Tanzania, Kenya, and otherwise — the African Union. 
Lingala is spoken in the west by the government and the military, 
Kikongo in the south-west, Tshiluba in the center.
I left my hotel at 6 in the morning and headed to the central 
roundabout where the army of phone sellers congregate. Goma is 
a late riser. A dismal showing of street sellers are setting up stands, 
and a few old ladies – bent at the hip – are ineffectually sweeping 
the dust off the road with home made brooms. I hired a motor-
taxi to take me to a refugee camp outside of the city. We followed 
one of two paved roads out of town, passed the roundabout with 
the grand statue, passed the new gas stations. My good-fortune 
soon ran out; within a few kilometers we were back on the lava-
encrusted dirt road.  Everyone is on this road, the wooden push-
bike kids, overburdened bicycles, motorcycles, SUVs, and troop 
transport UN trucks. For such a lively road, it is in amazingly 
decrepit state. Which means, as we whiz along, we are never more 
than a meter in any direction from smashing into someone or 
something. This would seem altogether unimportant if our path of 
travel was straight. In fact, it was neither horizontally nor vertically 
consistent. That my driver perpetually insisted on leaping out onto 
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the oncoming lane to play chicken was no less worrysome than the 
simple fact every pot-hole promised to eject me from the back of 
the motorcycle.  This was at first avoided by giving my driver a firm 
bear-hug and holding on for dear life. That is, until I realized that 
this overly friendly seatbelt method was not widely adopted, and 
that the much more dignified (albeit far less reassuring) way, was 
to hold on to the grab bars either side of the seat. Needless to say, 
the risk of ejection was only minimally diminished by this option. 
It was about an hour’s ride on the back of this wretched machine 
to the base of the camp. 
Past the city, the landscape opened up with green fields under 
squat mountains. We passed a school hoisting the red, yellow and 
sky-blue flag of the modern DRC. A gaggle of school children 
were corralled into order out front. Simultaneously, all traffic 
came to a stop. Like soldiers standing at attention, for only this 
brief moment, everyone stood still to pledge fealty to the flag. 
Most of the way down the green valleys the dirt was red. I was 
left at the side of the road. I had expected a refugee camp to be 
a striking, dramatic scene of chaos and depravity. In fact it is 
hidden, and absorbed into its surroundings. Assuming the driver 
had understood where I meant to go in the first place, I followed 
the side road up a hill. The road was quite wide, a service road for 
the camp. Either side of the road had numerous utilitarian stand-
alone shelters some twenty feet wide by ten feet deep. There are 
several of these industrial storage units standing half constructed 
or empty. The ones that are open have their contents exploding out 
onto the streets. It comes to me that the robustness of the storage 
units is what feels out of place, closer to bunkers than shacks. As 
everywhere, people were selling t-shirts, hats, proto-pharmacy 
supplies, fufu, anything. I spoke my few Swahili words to a boy 
and his father, as we both walked up the gravel hill, a network of 
vein-like paths shot out into the forest. Over the top of the hill was 
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After the collapse of the Gizenga government in 1962, disaffection 
in the east continued with the 1964 Maoist ‘Simba’ rebellion. 
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the refugee camp, a vast army-style array of UNHCR tarps and 
huts, all the same size, all hovels. Makeshift trenches had been built 
around them for drainage. The eastern half was all community 
buildings; schools, offices, congregation halls, etc… The western 
half was all the semi-permanent living huts you see on TV.  
Days later, I retraced my steps and found myself back at the 
refugee camp. Only this time instead of going relatively unnoticed, 
some man started yelling, and people milling about flocked to the 
ruckus. Arriving at the conclusion that it was I at the center of 
this commotion, I went over to the man. He didn’t say much, only 
directing me to an office where a group of four where congregating. 
Who was I? How did I get here? Again, who was I with? It seemed 
to make little sense to them that I wasn’t ‘with’ anyone, but that 
didn’t seem to matter relative to the larger point you cannot visit 
a refugee camp without a permit. So I was shown the door with 
a rifle. How, or where, I acquire said permit was beyond me. I 
returned home a second time, no closer to understanding.
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Though short lived, its resultant re-alignment of power in the 
Kivu’s would have a lasting impact on ethnic tensions. The Tutsi 
59’ers supported the rebellion. So too, the Tutsi of South Kivu (the 
Banyamulenge). Unlike the 59’ers, the Banyamulenge immigrated 
to the Kivus long before colonial rule, and broke ties with Rwanda 
in the process, sharing neither language nor cultural identity with 
their Rwandan kin.1 Disaffection amongst the Banyamulenge over 
the slaughter of their cattle led to the reversal of their allegiance, 
until ultimately, after attacks by Kabila’s rebels, hundreds joined 
the ranks of the Congolese Army (FAZ). As a result of their 
patronage, and more likely as a way to draw support away from 
larger ethnic groups in the Kivus, the minority Banyamulenge 
were given political power for the first time. 
Many were rewarded with lucrative positions in the provincial capital, and 
more and more of their children flocked to missionary schools. From a 
primarily rural, isolated, backward community, the Banyamulenge would 
soon become increasingly aware of themselves as a political force.2
As the link with Kinshasa increased, relations with their Bembe 
neighbours became increasingly inimical. By associating 
the Banyamulenge with the subsequent waves of Rwandans 
(particularly the Tutsis in 1959), ‘ethnic’ tribes and local 
government alike sought to deny the Banyamulenge the right to 
claim Congolese citizenship. “Candidates suspected of ‘foreign’ 
origins were systematically prevented from running during the 
1982 and 1987 elections on the grounds of ‘dubious nationality’”3. 
During the push for democracy in the early 90’s, the Banyarwanda 
(including the Banyamulenge) had hoped to establish political 
legitimacy by fielding candidates during the National Conference. 
All candidates were barred from attending.4
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2.11
The ‘chalet’, real name or not, is a mini resort-style bar on the coast 
of the lake. It has expensive drinks and foreign foods, like pizza and 
steak. Once a week it tries to pull in the mzungu population with 
cheaper drinks. This is where I found myself Wednesday night. 
Mostly, the chalet consists of a crisp green lawn that, at its far end, 
falls into the lake. It is sufficiently out of place here in Goma that 
no one really walks on it. The man who gives parking directions 
for bad drivers, the barman and the waitresses are Congolese; 
nearly everyone else is western.  The mzungus are split: those at 
leisure on the restaurant’s patio and those cramming shoulders at 
the bar. I met my Ukranian UN friend again. He promised to take 
me up in his helicopters, though his level of inebriation dampened 
any excitement about this idea. My effort to introduce myself to 
others largely fell flat. One particular encounter with a group of 
expats got subverted rather quickly. With the standard cultural 
signifiers asked: Where are you from? What are you doing here? 
What do you do? I made a perfunctory remark largely meant as 
humor about the long hours with little reward aspiring architects 
might look forward to. The response I got by an unknown NGO 
lady was: “don’t talk to me about hardship, you don’t know 
anything about hard work, I have the hardest work on the planet, 
I prevent genocide!” Even as a superficial, pat-yourself-on-the-
back comment, I wonder what sort of currency this remark carries 
in the wider culture. Perhaps, “I, and the system I am with, is in 
fact critical to preventing the savagery that would invariably take 
place if I was not here; We the enlightened torchbearers blessedly 
bestow onto the heathens this lamp of reason against their nature.” 
It flatly lacks wider perspective. And what exactly, I was tempted to 
ask, was her and her wider civilizing mission’s role in starting this 
genocide? I did not ask of course; it’s hard to make new friends 
with incendiary remarks. 
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2.12
Act Two. I’m slightly nervous from being chased, but feel largely 
indifferent. It is eerie when a solitary fuel truck motors passes with its two 
confused Egyptian UN soldiers blankly staring back at me. The night space 
reminds me of those seaboard towers keeping watch over forlorn fishermen, 
these streetlights especially useless in the emptiness of night.  A bit further I 
come on another scene. At some distance I can see that a big man is roughing 
it out with another person - seemingly a smaller man - but I can’t make 
out the details. I reason: they are just two drunks leaving the bar, which 
doesn’t bother me any. They are in the way of my running route, so I don’t 
turn back. A half-streets distance further it becomes too late, I feel my 
nonchalance is precisely and completely wrong. If at first I was curious, now 
I am dead afraid. This is no bar fight, but something much more severe 
between the large man and a woman. She looks completely panic-stricken. 
She fights back hard, filling the blanket silence with her yell. I have never 
seen panic so immediate. When I was far enough away, they were on the 
sidewalks beside the buildings to the right, now near, they are in the middle 
of the road. They are not moving anywhere, but not for lack of strain. She 
is caught, beaten, crying, yelling, and panicked. For the love of mercy, 
I wonder. What options do you really have? What right do I have to be 
here? Within seconds I had come to face them directly. We are now three, 
in the middle of the street, alone. She is half-naked; her clothes have been 
ripped off in the struggle. Accepting that it spells disaster for me personally, 
I resolve to insert myself as best I can. I take my headphones out, and yell to 
them, “Allez, Allez” loud as I can. “Vas te faire foutre, espece de salope.” (Go 
away, Fuck you, you son of a bitch). Nothing. Absolutely nothing. I’m sort 
of dumbfounded. I get closer and yell more, expecting him to turn around 
and fight. But nothing again. I am standing right in front of them and the 
violence is completely out of reach. 
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2.13
I visited the office of an international NGO, and talked to Ibrahim, 
who I supposed was the office manager. I had hoped to talk to 
someone about the situation in Goma with M23 and the various 
reports that have come out over the years from their office, but that 
was not possible. With my lowly clout-less status, I was directed 
to write down my questions for their public relations personnel. 
Outside the meeting room, a number of computers were manned 
by five or six local men.  I can understand the bureaucratic machine 
operating within such a large NGO, however I was disappointed 
that my questions where never answered. When I phoned back 
there was no recollection of my visit. In other words, fuck off. 
I do wonder then about the nature of these NGO’s. In 
the end, they are always accountable to the higher command, 
which invariably exists outside the country. The head (or senior 
researcher) in this case, is an external person. Abstractly, these 
western institutions join civil society under the veil of apolitical 
intervention, yet maintain and regulate, to a large extent, the lives 
within their catchment. The apolitical nature further justifies 
arms-length involvement, no real desire to transfer their power 
to the civil society itself. In other words, the tools of research, 
development and protest are kept in their domain. You don’t ever 
see an African ‘promoted’ to one of these NGO’s. I’m not sure I’ve 
seen a single African within any of the NGO camps. 
2.14
When the Rwandan army (the Rwandan Patriotic Front, [RPF]) 
attacked the Hutu refugee camps in 1996 - to neutralize the 
growing power of the genocidal militia (the ex-Rwandan Army 
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Force [FAR], and the interhamwe) - they naturally found an ally 
in the marginalized Banyamulenge. As seen elsewhere in the great 
lakes, the fomentation of exclusionary policies sowed the seeds for 
future violence. 
As the movement grew across North and South Kivu, 
encompassing widespread anger against Mobutu, the Rwandan 
army seized the opportunity to neutralize, not just its eastern 
border, but also the entire country. For its local figurehead the RPF 
(under pressure from the Ugandans) called on Laurent Kabila to 
form what would be known as the AFDL (Alliance of Democratic 
Forces for the Liberation of Congo).1 Under Rwanda’s occupation 
of the Kivus, it would be the ‘indigenous’ tribes that would be 
subject to discrimination.
Denied all possibility of political participation, economically exploited by 
Rwandan interlopers, and trampled underfoot by foreign occupying forces, 
their most salient common characteristic is their visceral hatred of all Tutsi, 
whether of Rwandan or Congolese origins.2
With Kabila’s protracted ascension to power 30 years after 
his initial rebellion, his strength as leader of the Congo rested 
completely with the Rwandan force. In the tide of increasingly 
anti-Tutsi sentiment, by 1998 Kabila took the fateful decision to 
expel his king-makers. In order to move his legitimacy beyond the 
clutches of Kigali, he banished his Rwanda advisors, and declared 
that all foreign troops leave the Congo. As Banyamulenge and 
Tutsi troops moved out of Kinshasa, hundreds of Tutsi, and Tutsi 
looking Africans were murdered by the army and angry Congolese 
mobs. Against the Rwandans, the Tutsi ‘enemy’, (encompassed 
by the specific term Banyamulenge), Kabila turned towards his 
former enemy, the Hutu refugees, and armed them. 
Once again, the marginalized Banyamulenge would be caught 
in the middle. As Rwanda prepared a reinvasion of the Congo, 
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2.15
There are a few main differences between Goma and Kinshasa, 
stemming from the difference in its foreign occupancy. If Kinshasa 
is a business and managerial hub, Goma is a humanitarian NGO-
polis. Photography is permitted and I can use much smaller 
denominations USD. However, still no singles. 
I am really quite confused about who built these NGO 
compounds. They are immense buildings, and numerous. Either 
they are constructed from NGO financing, or, they are rented 
from the Congolese. I have no way of knowing which it is, but 
I can not help but think that if it is the latter, it is dirty money. 
under their new proxy, the RCD (Rally for Congolese Democracy), 
the Banyamulenge would become increasingly distrustful and 
divided about their Rwandan protectors. Despite this, the greater 
need for security against their total annihilation meant they had 
little choice but to accept their position as Rwandan pawn. As 
the Second Congo War devolved into the criminal exploitation 
of resources, the original RCD promise to the Banyamulenge (to 
be a vehicle for the defense of their interests), inverted, and the 
instrumentalized Banyamulenge would exist to serve Rwandan 
interests. 
Few people have been dealt a harsher blow by history: many argue, with 
justice, that they have been twice victimized; first by Kagame, who used 
them as cannon fodder for the defense of Rwanda’s strategic interests; and 
then by Congolese extremists, as happened in Bukavu in June 2004 when in 
the wake of an abortive Banyamulenge-led coup, hundreds perished. Today 
Bukavu is virtually “free” of Banyamulenge.3
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The only people I know who own property here are wealthy elites, 
often tied to mining, and a tie to mining is a tie to violence. But 
this is just speculation. Rent in these rich district is expensive. For 
a house within a walled compound,  which, is most of downtown, 
it is pointless to think the anyone but the local business elite or 
a mzungu could afford it. Since the arrival of the humanitarian 
industry over two decades ago, the population of Goma has nearly 
quadrupled. With each wave of disaster, the local complexion of 
Goma changes. So to has the humanitarian community, swelling 
to compete for the demand. From ethnic violence in 93’, refugees 
in ’94, war in 96’, 98’, 02’, a volcano in ’02 and a continuation of 
violence since ’07, there are at the moment close to a hundred 
NGO’s in Goma. There is something odd about all these walls and 
trucks. It is hard not to look sideways at this friendly caste. My 
language, my education, my manners, and my power all separate 
me. Clearly there is risk, and clearly bureaucracies have exacting 
standards, but it seems at least possible that these are used more as 
an arms-length excuse to sublimate fear into necessity.  
Across from the Hotel Versaille there is another hotel. Although, 
I am not sure it is really a hotel in the sense customers pay to stay 
overnight. Most every night it blares the same five Congolese top-
of-the-pops hits ‘till nearly two in the morning. I am not bothered 
by it now, but at the beginning of my stay it was annoying.  One 
night, unable to sleep, I walked out the front gate and crossed the 
mere four meters to the other hotel. This is the second club I have 
been too, and it is an entirely local affair. Coco Jambo, the other 
club I have been to, is on the main paved drag, and is exactly the 
opposite. Every Friday/Saturday night it has a line of beached 
white SUV’s outside its walls, with the huge tacky sign telling 
you exactly where you are. Inside Coco Jambo is a parody of itself 
(much like my hotel, though to much different effect). It dresses 
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2.16
I walked around town today, up towards the airport, the rebels, 
and the poor. Commercial buildings along the main roads are an 
exhibition of color: sky blue for Primus beer or blood red for Coke. 
The colors are naturally exuberant in tone, their vitality nearly 
depleted now, under a layer of sediment. Most of these buildings 
look like they were painted long ago, with only a smattering of 
upkeep. As a general rule, the rich buildings made of modern 
materials, blue glass and tile, prefer the more official-looking air 
of neutral colors. The poor leave their building materials raw, an 
accumulation of unworked matter. It has rained again, so the rutted 
itself up as an idyllic beach resort with thatched huts and delicious 
bruschettes (meat on a stick). The music, like the clientele is 
west-pat. The so-far-nameless club across the street is a dirt shack 
much less contained in every respect. Crowds spill over out front, 
Chinese-import bikes swarm, music blares, sellers mix with party-
goers. I smiled and laughed with some people. It is loud and the 
Congolese dance with pleasure. If my presence in Coco Jambo is 
completely inconspicuous, here I am completely unwelcome. It is 
made clear enough that my presence is spoiling the fun.
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strings of dirt tracks are small pools and swamps of refuse. This 
neighborhood is called Birere. It is home to some of the poorest in 
Goma, split by the airport road. To the west, the ordered grid of 
car-carrying roads ties itself into the wider colonial infrastructure 
of roundabouts, paved avenues, and symphonic radial streets. 
On the opposite side there is a crush of houses that make the 
buffer zone between the formal city and the conjoined town of 
Gisenyi, Rwanda. Like bursting plumbing, the organization of the 
shanty-town is a display of anarchic popular construction. The 
proliferation of tin and wood shacks is evidence of a vast sea of 
people crashing against the territorial sea-wall. Like any frontier 
condition, not simply a boundary condition, weak government 
control is exploited for opportunities in trade, regulation, tax, or 
law paralleling state structures. In other words, whether talking 
about cassiterite or papaya, illicit and illegal networks of non-state 
actors working trans-state means subverts the colonial order. 
In this district, there is a complete collapse of negative space; 
streets of a regular dimension and trajectory start to disappear 
into corridors only a person or two wide, and finally collapse into 
interior veins of hallways facing bedrooms. The spatial logic of 
distinct zones or public space, use, and property is codified in a 
way that is entirely antithetical to colonial grid. The customary 
layer of space is, on first glance, collapsed in a single plane. It is 
often unclear where the road ends and a persons house starts. I 
asked one man how long he had lived here and also how many 
people lived here. He didn’t seem to speak much French. I found 
that not having a common language made my presence heavy. This 
was enough to persuade me not to speak much more or to endeavor 
much further. People are keenly interested in my existence as 
always, so I get a few hollered inquiries, though no real objections 
to my presence. 
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2.17
I met the same prostitute at the bar again today. This time I am 
sitting with Alain, a local customs officer at the airport. I talk with 
him often enough. A very kind man, insisting I join him for dinner 
at his house on Sunday. She was coming over to our party, asking 
us to buy her a drink. Aden (the German ex-soldier) despised 
her company, I declined to flirt, and Alain just ignored her. I still 
haven’t figured out what the relationship between Rwandans and 
Congolese is fully like. Judging by this woman, the Rwandans are 
largely tolerated but not much liked in Goma. 
Ethnicity and nationality are fiercely relevant terms to most 
people I meet, though few want to talk about them openly. Many 
people outwardly refer to themselves by the very general term, 
Bantu, possibly referring to the language of most of central and 
southern Africa (Kinyarwanda, Swahili, Lingala, etc.) or a people 
(as distinct from the Hamites, i.e. Tutsi). I don’t generally ask 
what people mean when they say Bantu. It is impossible to know 
who is a Rwandan immigrant from any of the major migratory 
movements; either the genocide of 94’, the pogroms of 60’, the 
colonial labor programs of the 20’ s-30’s, or another.  
The last six decades of intermittent war have seen every 
sympathy and antagonism cross every party’s path. Despite this, 
there is a fierce national sentiment across the Congo. Despite the 
fact that Kivu province is functionally and geographically distant 
from Kinshasa, there is no obvious sign of anti-nationalism. In 
fact, like the traffic stopping during raising the flag at schools, 
most people believe in the unified state, choosing instead to vent 
their anger quite specifically on the UN or Kabila. Even the tyrant 
Mobutu is widely respected for his ability to keep the country in a 
unified, formal peace.
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2.18
The other day, in frustration, I chopped off all my hair. My straight 
razor became too dull to continue, my beard was left untouched. 
So now people look at the mzungu and laugh. They say my head 
is upside down. So I tell them they don’t know the half of it. I 
asked around what ‘mzungu’ meant. Apart from its apparent 
connotation of a white man, or any foreigner for that matter, it 
translates from Swahili to mean basically a confused person. 
“someone who roams around aimlessly” or “aimless wanderer” 
being the direct translation given. Emphasis on futility.
Found myself at a UN party last night hosted by the Uruguayan 
contingent. I doubt a civilian is permitted in a UN military base 
but the guards didn’t ask. My friends said I was UN and none 
of the soldiers and staff inside seemed to mind me being there. I 
spent most the night drinking with the Ukrainian regional safety 
commander. He’s a young, clearly lonely guy. The rest of the 
company is mostly male and culturally homogenous. There do not 
seem to be any Indians, South African, or others present.
The grounds consist of an expectantly large array of weapons, 
barracks, offices, and vehicles. Unlike many of the other UN bases, 
the Uruguayans have their base near town, adjacent to the airport. 
It seems like the Indian base is also downtown.  I have not seen it, 
but the South Africans are based to the north, near the rebels. In 
all, UN bases cover the lake, the airport, and the road into town.
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I went to church yesterday with Seth and his family. It was 
unpleasant at best, and maddening at worst, the singing and 
music exempt. It was a six or seven hour affair, starting earlier 
in the morning than I would have liked. My friends drove up to 
the hotel in their large SUV. We left for church with five others 
crammed inside. We drove past the familiar market and into the 
rock district. Here the roads are so rough that the SUV bounces 
far more than it drives. It is so slow we might as well walk. Which 
would also make good spatial sense. The roads are incredibly 
narrow, sandwiched between waist-high stone walls. I feel a 
little ridiculous in such an expensive vehicle too, surrounded by 
these stone and wood shacks. Given their wealth, I am somewhat 
surprised that we are in the poorer area, the disparity done away 
with by denominational unity. We arrived late to the small white 
church, so all of us spread out around the concrete-floored room 
with white plastic chairs. The pulpit was only slightly raised from 
the floor, and the only thing ornate about the room. To its left 
was a picture of Jesus and to the right a picture of the American 
missionary, William Branham (of whom I had never heard; the 
fact proving scandalous).  The minister was away, so a screen was 
rolled down and the recorded sermon projected on it. In French, 
not Swahili, the sermon started and continued with a patronizing 
diatribe against all Arabs. The disorder and deaths of the Arab 
Spring, the sermon proclaimed, was predicted in the bible. Further, 
the Palestinians entirely deserved their oppression. Again, because 
the bible granted the sons of Israel the rightful return to their land 
by any means necessary. At some point, a local man I knew stood 
up to talk. He was speaking to me despite looking at the room, “I 
know the west does not believe in these things, they think they are 
modern, but we here know that to be wrong, we know we are not 
backwards, we do not need any other proof of this, our truth is 
written in this bible”. What he was referring to in specific was the 
2.19
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biblical abomination of gays destroying the sanctity of god’s love. 
“Beware,” they all shouted, “Sodom and Gomorrah will surely 
befall whichever community accepts this sin.” Final hymns were 
sung in French, and Swahili, including the illustrious ‘Onward 
Christian soldiers’.
We funneled out the back door of the church to the tune of 
the band, near-everyone smiling broadly. The congregation lined 
up so that everyone could take turns shaking hands. A gesture of 
solidarity, disorienting in its forced intimacy. I can only mutter a 
sincere appreciation for the hospitality and a half earnest mungu 
akubariki (dieux vous bénisse, God bless you). Afterwards we 
returned home for lunch. It was entirely prepared by the women, 
who did not eat with the men or at the same time as the men. It 
was a red stew of fish with fufu. I hate fufu, the mashed up brick of 
Cassava or plantain ubiquitous across Sub-Saharan Africa, but this 
is completely delicious.
Afterwards the professor introduced me to a businessman 
with considerable wealth and education. Of the many people I 
talked to - both national and expat - his history of the region was 
one of the few that seemed in line with what I thought was the 
truth. It seemed to me people have a different reasons for their 
understanding of the world around them. Some are swayed by 
propaganda. Others focus on the immediate needs of subsistence 
living.  
Others yet are not terribly intellectually tied to the wider 
history or polity from lack of education or cultural amnesia. Of 
course, people talk as freely as they see fit, which says nothing 
of their understanding. It also seems that history ultimately has 
a fragile hold on rational understanding, invariably marshaled to 
operate in concert with the present. 
After asking how I liked the sermon, likely sensing my unease, 
the businessman proceeded of his own volition to explain the 
74TOO MUCH TIME, OR TOO LITTLE
historic role of Christianity in Congo. Given I was sitting with 
the church congregation I was surprised to hear he saw the 
missionaries as an apparatus of the colonial state. This resonated 
with my assumption that the first missionaries planted the seed of 
compliance for the state, followed by, and then allowed, the state 
to brandish its rod of correction. Or was it the chicotte.
A conversation I found fairly typical, expat and local alike, 
followed: “the black man laughs when the Chinese man expresses 
his surprise at black intelligence. ‘How can it be, they ask, that 
the most powerful (and therefore smartest) man on the planet is 
in fact black, i.e. Mr. Obama.’ And then in the same frame turns 
around to proclaim proudly, “Thank god for the black man’s good 
sense of morality, which the godless Chinese do not possess.’ The 
atheist Ban-Ki Moon’s helm of the UN notwithstanding, I think 
to myself. Damn one group for their ignorance, then go on to 
damn another group’s inferiority, that’s the way the world goes 
round. 
2.20
Again I got up early, and headed towards the familiar phone 
market in the central roundabout. What I wanted was a tour of 
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the city. When I asked the moto-taxis to help me out with this, 
they looked back with confusion. ‘But where do you want to go?’ 
Funny, I think, “n’importe, anywhere, everywhere, this is your 
city, fait-moi un tour.” We bargain a price for an hour’s service, 
which comes to 1 USD. My driver Immanuel is a little quiet at 
first, taking me to places I had already walked, but I do my best 
to break through this formality. Talking, however, is not so easy 
on the back of a motorcycle. I’m interested in what Immanuel 
might see as valuable to a tourist, in a town with not more than a 
dozen tourists a year. It is a mix of popular things like the stadium, 
rich things like the waterfront mansions and palatial hotels, and 
beautiful things. We first go up the paved road I’m well familiar 
with, then onto dirt roads that take us to the large market, and 
then the cathedral destroyed by the volcano in 2002. We then take 
a turn into the moonscape. 
The lava from the 2002 volcano eruption destroyed large chunks 
of the city. What the lava destroyed has now been re-appropriated, 
with workers constantly chipping away at the deposits to make 
stone bricks. And so where Goma is not red and brown, it is grey 
with rock. The road however is left as sediment. Looping back, we 
take the road out of town to Uvira, past the huge shell of a building 
containing the university. It’s flush with kids, though the building 
itself has no windows. We descend further, to the lake where we 
pass one of the harbor ports. The fishermen in their traditional 
wooden catamarans contrast well against the legion of moto-taxi 
drivers washing themselves and their bikes in the lake. Immanuel 
is coming to revel in the fact that he has a tourist interested in 
his city. He wants me to take a picture of nearly everything. Here, 
at the motorcycles, I’m really not keen on this idea, though he 
continues to insist. Without fail, as soon as I take my camera out, 
one man shouts and the whole chorus of taxi-men follows, with a 
veritable mutiny forming rapidly. Immanuel assuages the group in 
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Swahili for a time, but then realizes it is simply more prudent to 
leave, and quickly. We continue home along the water.  The water 
is where the rich live. The UN has a massive base here. There’s a 
new building the size of a football field going up. And the NGOs 
too own property here, all directly on or are near the water. When 
we are back at the phone market, I am exhausted.
2.21
At the UN, Aden looks after the forces’ non-military vehicles. 
Much of his day involves testing drivers and administering licenses. 
For UN staff to drive the big white SUV’s, they are required to 
have an UN-issued or approved license. That is, in addition to 
their national license. One might expect this process to be a mere 
formality, given the existing evidence of proficiency, but no, as a 
carrier of diplomatic neutrality, the UN rightfully makes concerted 
efforts to minimize destructive action in its area of influence. One 
commonly heard rumor says an accident — not just caused by, but 
simply involving the UN — is so damaging to their image, that the 
UN covers all costs related to the accident.  The more far-fetched 
rumors say local actors deliberately hit UN vehicles, expressly to 
collect on these damages. 
It may be wise not to take these stories too seriously. 
In any case, the real problem starts when it is clear, during 
testing, some do not know how to drive. Despite the fact they 
own a license. (I do not make a generalization here, nor comment 
on the frequency of this inadequacy; I note merely that it exists.) 
The problem is explained in this way.  Many of the UN civilians 
and volunteers come from the global south, where access to private 
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vehicles, for the majority, remains out of reach. Coming from this 
poverty, they are attracted to the different UN missions for the 
financial security. Aden (a working-class German) does not care 
much for his job, but others greatly value theirs.  When they 
arrive, they are required to do their work with a vehicle. This is 
compounded by the fact that any and all movement in the city 
must be by vehicle. They come to Aden and fail the driving test, 
sometimes not knowing where to put the key. They are allowed 
to return once, within a short period, for re-examination, but this 
is little consolation, given the depth of inability. It is with some 
sadness that he recounted one particular lady, who, having failed 
the test, started to cry and plead with him to pass her regardless. 
Failing the test is synonymous with an inability to work. She 
would be sent home. In his usual way, Aden just shook his head, 
smothered his cigarette and said, sorry, that is not my problem. 
Joseph, (the chef de travaux a L’institut Superieur des Techniques 
Appliquees, the head of research at the higher institute for applied 
technology) and Damas, (the Secrétaire Général Administratif 
de l’Institut du Båtiment et des Travaux Public de Rutshuru, 
Administrative Secretary General of the Institute of Building and 
Public Works at Rutshuru) came to visit me at my hotel. We sat 
in the courtyard with some sodas.  I hadn’t known the purpose of 
their visit. The family tends to stop by, unannounced, to see how 
I’m making out. Today we talk about the importance of knowledge, 
and consequently the west’s monopoly on this resource. What is 
decided is that economic development and aid are irrelevant if 
knowledge assets are not exchanged in the process.
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Where I can I have made a concerted effort to learn Swahili. 
Unfortunately it is an obstinately difficult language to remember. 
Where my memory falters, my sketchbook is full of expressions 
that I turn to when necessary. Thankfully, my very broken “Habari 
Gani? Mzuri Sana” (Commment-allez vouz, Tres Bien / How are 
you? Grand) are never shunned and mostly embraced. Even better 
are the ridiculous pronouncements. For example, when weaseling 
out of conversations about money, asking “unalewa?” (est-vous 
burre? Are your drunk?) is a well received joke. “hacuna sheda”, (il 
n’y a aucun problème, no problems) or Mtu huyu atalipia kila kitu, 
(this person will pay for everything) has been great to break down 
formality. The Congolese are not shy talking about sex either. 
Today I met with a prostitute at my hotel. I should have known 
she was a prostitute from the fact that she was dressed remarkably 
provocatively and was strikingly beautiful, but I didn’t at first. The 
office manager, Etienne, and I were sitting out front of the office 
chatting when she came in, spoke to him in Swahili (I assumed) 
then spoke to me in English. I did not understand how she knew 
I was English, or why she chose to speak to me in English. It was 
raining, and she said she was looking for her friend. I said I’d been 
here for an hour or so but hadn’t seen her. She just sort of looked 
at me blankly. Etienne just sort of watched and shrugged. I asked 
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Act Three. It is a startling picture. In the middle of a street there is a 
scrawny shirtless mzungu, a half naked and pulverized woman, and a large 
black man in a wife-beater.  He is too absorbed by his prey or his anger to 
notice me; she is blind, clearly seeing nothing. And me, I am present. Now 
what? Another older woman has come out from the building and tries to 
intervene too, though, from a distance. Passive intervention is achieving 
nothing, so I press my nerves to forcefully intervene. Looking around to 
see if this is really the only option — which frankly seems horrendously 
fatalistic — I notice that there are 3 men leisurely observing the events from 
a balcony. In a fury I yell to them.  What are you doing? How can you 
just stand there? why are you not helping this woman? They yell back with 
disgusting nonchalance, “non. non. Il est militaire…. Stop. He is military”. 
Panic comes over me. I am in his face, but I had not hit him, and thank god. 
Any hope I wouldn’t get hurt had already been lost, I can accept that to a 
degree. But the military and the police are a different affair. At best I would 
be pulverized, and in jail. At worst dead.  Dumbfounded, I run past them 
as fast as I can, hoping, without looking, he or any of the other military 
weren’t interested in my useless effort.  I leave with the sound of her head 
cracking into a wall, the ultimate goal clearly to trap her in the building to 
be raped. I have no idea who she was, I just run deeper into the pitch black 
side streets.
It occurs to me that I really was invisible. As a white man, connected 
for all they know to the UN, I have some perverse immunity in a culture of 
impunity. If its true that I do, it is equally true that the woman does not.  
her where she was from, she said Rwanda, she’d come over for the 
day. Ok, now it made sense. 
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In a small shack no bigger than two and a half widths of hanging 
clothes, I was bartering with a lady for 2 shirts for about 20 USD. 
We couldn’t agree on a price (which I knew was high). Seeing as 
I had nowhere near the money she wanted, I moved to leave the 
store. The rather dour seller made no protest, but another man 
about my age did. He had heard the conversation, and told me he 
would pay the 5 USD I was short. I hesitated as much as I could, 
but then relented and thanked the man for his generosity. This 
simple role reversal was astounding. He explained that the seller 
was his cousin and that he didn’t mind helping me out. He asked 
me what I was doing, and when I mentioned that I was a student 
of architecture and here to observe life, he looked puzzled and 
asked for further elaboration. I explained, now routine, my story. 
He beamed at the functional idea of a tourist. He insisted we take 
a tour in his SUV to show off the town he took such great pride 
in. His name is Patrick. He founded and runs a local NGO in the 
Masisi area to help children affected by the war. His is the only 
local NGO I contact in Goma (not that there aren’t many others, 
they just aren’t visible in the city). Simply because rent is too high 
downtown.  The first thing we do is leave the rich quarters. 
The whole western part of Goma is untouched by mzungus. 
His high school is picturesque; a green field covers the grounds 
underneath elevated buildings. It is secluded and well maintained. 
He sees his old teacher and reminisces. The university, where 
his girlfriend is studying, is also set in a field, although this time 
it is dirt. Both schools are gender-segregated. We drive down 
another road to a shack that looks like many other shacks. Several 
men have gathered inside.  It always amazes me how decrepit 
the outside of these properties can appear, while inside the care 
is clearly evident. The irregularity that exists in the built form 
tricks the eye into thinking it is seeing disrepair. These men are all 
young, and generally they lounge about. They are members of a 
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With some degree of vindicatory pride, an NGO worker told to 
me this story.
A friend of his, a fellow mzungu NGO, was at the central fruit 
market buying a bushel of bananas. The market is not nearly as 
busy as the larger market uptown, and has a Mzungu tourist shop 
at its eastern end. Given its central location, near the rich district, 
2.26
church gathered here to prepare religious literature for university 
orientation starting next week. It is, across Africa I have learned, a 
generally bad idea to say you are without God and his company. 
Interestingly, it largely does not matter which god. God itself is 
synonymous with moral direction. The topic of religion is largely 
inescapable; a thick smear of religious poultice covers everything 
and everyone. Being a good agnostic I had earlier claimed only 
half sympathies with Christianity. Patrick knew full well this 
required further proselytization. The leader of the group, an older 
man, made sure to take me outside and read me their brochure 
about the basic tenants of Christianity and Christ’s love. I did not 
care to raise any nuanced objections to the simple and dogmatic 
form of Christianity foisted on me. I listened, and agreed where 
appropriate.  
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this is not surprising. It is also falling apart: the wood structure 
and tin cladding is patched where necessary. But, back to the 
story. This mzungu NGO brought the bananas to the Congolese 
seller and tried to give his money. The Congolese lady told him 
she would not accept it. She wanted more. The Mzungu refused 
to pay anything more than the ‘real’ price, the price he had many 
times before, and was indignant he would have to pay more than 
its ‘worth’. But still she demanded more. If the bananas were some 
inconsequentially few Congolese francs in value (including the 
now imposed ‘tourist tax’), the man’s reaction was to pull out from 
his wallet a crisp ten USD bill. No, it was not for the sake of getting 
more change. With a lighter from his pocket, he held the bill up 
like a strange form of sacrifice, and burnt it.  This act of sabotage 
roused the entire market. So he did it again. 
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Mostly, my presence in Goma confounds people I meet. If they are 
foreigners, they ask what organization I am with. If they are locals, 
they ask what agenda I hold. If I say I am an architecture student, 
they laugh. The fact is, I had a return ticket out of Kinshasa but 
found the capital cost-prohibitive, so I decided to come here 
instead. I have no idea what I am doing here. I say I am writing an 
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architecture thesis, so they say, on what? Its simpler I figure, and 
more precise to just say, I am taking it all in. 
Apart from what I am doing here, many westerners seem to 
wonder how I got here. I’ve learned now, the acceptable route to 
Goma is not through Kinshasa but through Kigali, Rwanda.  Or 
conversely if you are UN, to take a UN designated plane from 
Kinshasa. The uninterrupted deterioration of the road networks 
from the colonial era has made overland journeys possible only 
with a land cruiser. It is extremely hazardous for its remoteness, or 
equally, militia violence. 
The fact that I arrived on a Congolese-operated airline 
from Kinshasa is unheard of. To improve its image, the DRC 
government has banned former soviet era jets and pilots. Never 
the less, the NGOs I talk to say they are not allowed to take these 
planes, due to the high rate of crashes. 
One street I walk down has a barbershop, amongst luggage 
shops, pots, pans, and more barbershops. The man in the 
barbershop takes great pleasure when I walk past. I’ve always got a 
smile for him, and he always has a smile for me. Another common 
scene: while walking around I often intersect with a large white 
mzungu-driven SUV and the street-business men. Because the 
mzungus in the SUV’s can’t walk, and don’t walk, a meeting like this 
is restricted to the entrance of a shop. As soon as the big SUVs or 
Personnel Carriers stop, the small object sellers leap up from their 
inertness, rush to the windows, and foist their goods on them. It’s 
a hectic scene. I was there before the SUVs arrived, and still there 
after they departed, though I doubt I ever get more than a passing 
glance. Maybe Alan, said I to myself, you are left alone because 
people think you are just really stupidly unfortunate not to have 
managed to finagle a big white car like the rest of the mzungus.
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When the insurrections of 1964-65 revealed how poorly the 
Congolese army performed, the South African and European 
mercenaries (and bomber missions composed of Cuban exiles 
in the pay of the CIA) stepped in to prop up America’s cold war 
ally.1  With the mobilization of western interventionist brigades 
assuring western domination in the Congo, Mobutu seized power 
in 1965. America’s contribution to the Congo was in no small way 
significant for the collapse of plurality in the post colony. When 
the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank 
threatened to withhold payments to Mobutu’s kleptocracy, the 
full bore of American pressure on them kept aid-money flowing.2 
With international pressure alleviated, and financed secured, 
Mobutu was able to cauterize local political opposition through 
continued patronage funding and violence. 
Mobutu’s unrelenting efforts to thwart democratic opposition forces, his 
highly personalized style of rulership, built partly on repression and partly 
on extensive patronage networks, his scandalous squandering of the Congo’s 
wealth, his megalomaniac obsession with grandiose development schemes 
at the expense of public goods for the masses, and his pathetic sauve-qui-
peut attitude in the face of the relentless march of the AFDL on Kinshasa 
were critical factors in the ultimate collapse of his Bula Matari kingdom.3
By the end of the cold war, with little political incentive to keep 
hold of their geo-political dinosaur, the Americans withdrew their 
veto of IMF restrictions on Congolese funds. By this time Mobutu 
had accumulated some $70 million USD of debt (having received 
over the course of his rule 1965-1988, some $860 million USD)4. 
With the overnight collapse of Mobutu’s patronage network, 
other means where initiated to counter growing antagonism to 
his rule. With the demands for democratic reform during this 
period, (fueled by Belgium, France, and the US), opposition 
parties were allowed in the Congo for the first time in 35 years. 
Democratic reform and the semblance of political plurality did 
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not mean Mobutu intended to relinquish power. Revision to 
the Second Republic’s constitution in 1990 determined Mobutu 
alone could set the timetable for this democratic reform. While 
Mobutu gradually granted concessionary power to the public by 
organizing the National Conference (CNS) — later to become 
the High Council of the Republic (HCR) — disorganization 
within the opposition allowed Mobutu to continue his political 
factionalism and patronage through the now-legitimized 
semblance of democratic reform. On February 24, 1993 the civil 
guard surrounded opposition congregations so as to not allow 
members to leave for three days. On March 9th 1993, Mobutu 
called a conclave of HCR delegates in order to bribe them to 
switch sides, further dangling the prospect of an appointment to 
the position of prime-minister. Mobutu was able to overcome the 
opposition, despite his meager resources, because the polity was 
equally anemic.  
Set against a quarter of a century of patrimonial rule, the organizational 
weakness of Zairian society must be seen as the logical consequence of the 
Mobutist state. Patrimonial rule sets sharp limits on the organization of 
independent power centers; state-society relations are mediated through 
personalized linkages, of a patron-client variety…The civil society is largely 
reducible to a congeries of kin groups and ethnic associations.5
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I was sitting drinking a coffee today, drawing a picture as best I 
could. A middle aged Congolese lady saw this. ‘C’est pas vrai? 
Its really good’ she says. Wow, she keeps exclaiming.  Soon a few 
people were called over. ‘So you can draw me next?’, she jests. With 
resigned embarrassment I gave excuse I wasn’t done the present 
set yet. She laughed and said, well when you’re done I’m next. Of 
course, my friend.
A few times now, I’ve spent a few minutes sketching on a stoop 
next to the men selling shoes, or medicine, or bread. If a mzungu in 
a truck is commonplace, a mzungu walking is odd, then a mzungu 
sitting still is just suspect. By my own admission, the attention it 
drew always made me unsettled. It felt a bit like I was mocking the 
work of those beside me, so I gave up the practice. 
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Epilogue. I ran away as fast as I could, and as far as I could, either 
to get my mind and my energy to disassociate, or to punish myself for my 
lack of effort. You simply cannot outrun cowardice and shame; you simply 
cannot suppress violence with more violence. I came back to the hotel later, 
looping back with enough distance to avoid the rest of the incident. I saw 
more military men on the way back, sitting around, standing smoking. This 
time I saw they had uniform pants. For all the city cared to show me in the 
empty streets, these men had just finished an irrelevant game of cards. There 
is nothing to record her pain. 
It is an utterly vicious thing to have to interrogate right and wrong. 
Does the banality of evil rely on the abstraction of violence, the indifference 
to the unavoidable? Or do the latent failings of bottom-up responses to 
structural issues risk further antagonism and violence. Brute force, for all 
I know, is a shallow path. I am furious. No notion of good in isolation will 
ever be good. With no lineage of action, no consensus of justice, the concept 
does not exist. There is nothing to be done. It does not matter. The rightful 
authorities of the state will not come to protect its citizen when it is the state 
that is the criminal. 
On my way back I flagged down a moto-taxi standing in the middle of 
the same road. I stopped him and asked whether he had seen anything, or if 
he came up to it while driving, whether he could warn me.  He looked at me 
with indifference. ‘What do you want me to do. This is the Congo’. 
All the best Victor.
Alan 
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Since the official end of the Second Congo War in 2003,  western 
intervention has tended to focus on issues of progress. Where the 
war saw some 5 million Congolese dead, the issues surrounding the 
collapse of the Congo tended to focus on its status as a Leviathan 
problem.1 The absence of, the rule of law, of the state, of order, 
could be addressed by promoting liberal democracy: “in various 
UN documents, elections marked a ‘turning point in the history 
of the Congo’ and heralded an era of peace, democracy, and social 
development.”2 
Proof, for the Americans and the British, lay squarely in the 
post-genocidal success of  Rwanda, as compared to the Congo. 
The astronomical developmental progress was described by Bill 
Clinton as having “freed the heart and the mind of  his people”.3 
As Severine Austesserre points out in her book The Trouble 
with the Congo, the push towards democratization in the post-
conflict polity of  the Congo largely short-sided local conflicts. 
By painting local conflict as subsidiary to national issues, the UN 
could put out the residual grass-fires by building the power of  
the state. 
As a UN official described, a state-building process oriented at the macro 
level would provide the Congo with legitimate state authorities who would 
subsequently address the “law and order” problems in the eastern provinces.4
For the UN, the organization of elections was seen as apolitical 
(in the sense of a non-colonial interference within a sovereign 
state), and centrally executable (logistically focused around heads 
of states, and capital cities).5 The bias that national issues held, 
— “legislative and constitutional process or the tensions within 
the Transitional Government”6  — took greater precedent over 
events occurring in the territories. Accordingly, the rhetoric of 
development drew focus away from conditions occurring in the 
territories: “the psychological disconnect between elections and 
peace had become such that diplomats envisioned the possibility of 
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a successful completion of the ‘transition to peace and democracy’ 
even in the event of renewed war.”7 Holding elections in the 
Congo was equivalent with democracy tout court. Violence in the 
Kivus, as seen since the end of the Congo war until the present day, 
was transmuted in the ‘post-conflict’ landscape, in turn displacing 
its significance (as war cannot exist in peace) so that development 
remained the greatest priority. 
Most countries, as well as the UN, claimed to be involved in the Congo 
primarily out of humanitarian interest. They accordingly devoted most of 
their bilateral aid for the Congo to humanitarian or development projects 
rather than to political or security ones.8
The Wests support for Kagame — despite the fact that Uganda 
and Rwanda were instrumental to the neo-colonial war machine 
in the Congo, and the rise of  mineral-exploitation — centered 
on his ability to convert foreign aid into recognizable physical 
and economic development. In an article written for the New 
York Times, a diplomat explains why the West has heaped praise 
on Kagame:
Kagame has become a rare symbol of progress on a continent that has an 
abundance of failed states and a record of paralyzing corruption…You put 
your money in, and you get results out,” said the diplomat... “Yes, Kagame 
was “utterly ruthless,” the diplomat said, but there was a mutual interest in 
supporting him, because Kagame was proving that aid to Africa was not a 
hopeless waste and that poor and broke countries could be fixed with the 
right leadership.9
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It being my last day in the DRC before going on to Rwanda, I 
wanted to say goodbye to the good people I’d met. For lunch I 
sat with Aden, and for dinner I sat with Seth. Aden, the Bosnian 
Muslim ex-German soldier turned UN civilian worker, had 
reached a breaking point. Not that it was a surprise; his embodied 
order and efficiency was in daily complete conflict with the 
realities around him. An alcoholic for sure, his unhappiness 
could be summed up by the way he collapsed. Into his sixth or so 
Heineken, he called over the girl working at Salt and Pepper. She, 
as far as I could tell, worked every day of the week. Or damn near 
it. Young, maybe 16 or 17, she was there from opening ‘till closing. 
She dressed stylishly, a different outfit daily, maybe because work 
was the only place she appeared to the world. Because Aden was 
at Salt and Pepper (an Indian restaurant) nearly every day during 
his free hours they regularly exchanged friendly jokes. He said to 
her now, “You know what the problem with the Congo is?” I had 
assumed he was referring to the war. “that all the Congolese are 
lazy bloody bastards. I can’t think of a single one that is capable 
of doing an honest days work. The Congo should be bombed, the 
UN should level the whole country with its planes. Leave it to the 
chimpanzees then, they could run it better than these Congolese. 
Look at the Rwandans, that is paradise! And this, this is a shithole!” 
I felt really bad for him, and worse for the girl who had to take this 
racist outburst. Thankfully it was in English, which is not widely 
understood in the Congo. Despite this diatribe, on the absolute 
fringe of day-to-day experience for most foreigners, I don’t think 
Aden is actually racist, nor even an elitist.  I have seen his respect 
for the hard work of the Nigerian Chief of Security for an NGO, 
talk jovially with the Indian UN medic and the Indian bar owners. 
Or more to the point, we have all sat and drank with a local 
customs officer many times. Today was different because it seemed 
like a wider systematic conflict between ideals of order, prejudice 
2.32
92TOO MUCH TIME, OR TOO LITTLE
and reality. He is not the first to say that Rwanda is a paradise for 
Africa, this banal comment being a sign of greater disquiet. It 
does not feel like a clash of two altogether incompatible systems 
(the North and order, the DRC and disorder), but a form of 
engagement between the two, both simplistic and short-circuited. 
It is unfortunate the false assumption amongst so many mzungu 
that violence is preceded by poverty, and that poverty is preceded 
by laziness and incompetence. It is as if Tin-tin in the Congo has 
reached the modern age. 
My farewell dinner with my Congolese friend is odd too, largely 
due to the presence of his girlfriend. We eat at the European 
restaurant merely for geographic convenience, but her overly fussy 
demands are distracting.  It is a shame. Seth and his father had no 
reason to help, or ensure my comfort, but they did, by many orders 
of magnitude. It seems likely she doesn’t particularly respect my 
presence in Goma or with Seth. 
Later we take some motos to his sister’s house out past the 
university. The outer walls are typically decrepit but the gate 
opens to a courtyard with clearly-for gardens and a smattering of 
buildings. In all, we are Seth, his sister, her husband, his sister and 
mother in their small living room. The men in the room keep the 
conversation simple and cordial. The women are too curious for 
that. They immediately suss out that there is more to my story then 
I am letting on. In particular, Seth’s sister-in-law is outlandishly 
jovial and direct. I wish I could remember her name.  In the instance 
of us all chatting, she was serious and frank. With a grounded-ness 
I seldom heard from either camp, she spoke of her frustrations and 
her cares. It was especially powerful to hear this strong voice from 
a woman. Hopefully, in a general sense, these voices carry well past 
the domestic scene. 


95 PART III : KIGALI
kigAli, rwAndA
discover rwanda Youth hostel | 1993
PArt iii:






97 PART III : KIGALI
This morning at six o’clock, bag packed, I set out to cross the 
Rwandan border. It is only about eight hundred meters from my 
hotel; in fact I had passed it numerous times before. Rwanda, 
as opposed to the Congo, is a remarkable easy country to enter. 
I had first applied for a visa a few weeks ago, with the idea that 
should the situation in the Congo reach an untenable limit I 
would take the back-door out to Rwanda. However, finding 
Goma quite attractive, I let the first visa expire. Rather than fly 
back to Kinshasa where my return-flight waited, I decided I 
would re-apply for a Rwandan visa. No problem. Unbelievably for 
Congolese standards, the process is done online, takes all of three 
days to process, and costs 40 USD. None of this can be said for the 
ease of attaining a Congolese visa. 
The Congolese side of the border is, as expected, rather 
confusing. As always, finding the right man, to get the right 
papers, to bring to the other right man is needlessly inefficient. 
Once through, the female guard searches me despite the fact I have 
nothing to declare. Plastic grocery bags, which are not permitted 
in Rwanda, are confiscated from my pack. My wet shoes, now 
liberated, foul the rest of my bag. 
At least in a car, or a plane, there is a certain degree of 
abstraction with border crossings, the myth is at least somewhat 
believable with its temporal and spatial disconnect. None of that 
exists when walking across an international border. 
Rwanda, I think on. The over-simplification of racial conflict 
(Hutu and Tutsi) as foremost and eternal in the great lakes regions, 
particularly post-genocide, seems to reduce a wider complex 
history to singular event, and the genocide to its apotheosis. 
Madness or Barbarity. Though in certain instances true, the 
simplest explanations seems the most self-serving.  
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By the time the Belgians left Rwanda in 1962, their colonial 
alliance with the Tutsi minority had expired. By 1958 Belgian 
allegiance had turned sharply to supporting the Hutu majority 
they once oppressed.  The Hutu Revolution of 1959-1962 would 
not have succeeded without the logistical and material backing 
of both Belgium and its soft-surrogate, the Christian church. In 
the post colony, financial and development aid gave arms-length 
credibility to the ruling Hutu, just as Colonialism’s practice of 
indirect rule artificially elevated the power of the Tutsi monarchy. 
Rhetorically, if the church saw religious and moral depravity as a 
source of entry into Rwandan society, the new entry point for the 
international community would be technical development. For 
the desolately poor nation ruled by one successive oppressive Hutu 
regime after another, the years prior to the genocide of 1994 saw 
successive waves of foreign aid, to the extent that Rwanda boasted 
one of the highest densities of foreign technical assistance across 
Africa. Prior to 1994, the international community largely saw 
Rwanda as a promising young nation, whose structural stability 
made it ripe with solvable problems. Rwanda boasted a growing 
GDP, the semblance of social welfare, with high rates of food 
and medicine availability, and a trust of NGO’s and cooperatives 
within civil society.1 In a World Bank report from 1976 (3 years 
after the second military coup that brought new radical Hutu’s to 
power) the Memorandum on the Economy of Rwanda stated that: 
despite these handicaps [low income, an embryonic modern sector, a land 
shortage, rapid population growth, and its inland position] the present 
Government . . . has made perceptible progress in developing a strategy to 
lift the economy from its present low level.2
Fifteen years later, and three years prior to the genocide, Rwanda 
was presented in the same terms: “despite these constraints, 
Rwanda has made a creditable effort toward economic and social 
development”.3 This trust in the progress of state formation would 
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see exceptional amounts of fiscal aid directed towards the Rwandan 
government. The World Bank estimates that in the period 1982 to 
1987 foreign assistance financed over 70% of public investment. 
In the reports, the problems facing Rwanda were poverty, high 
population and environmental erosion. These technical problems 
could be remedied by Western intervention. Much like Abraham 
Kaplan’s law of the instrument4, the World Bank and most NGO’s 
largely ignored political realities even after civil war, with its sharp 
increase in ethnic rhetoric, had broken out in 1990. “In its mission 
to combat the burdens of poverty, the World Bank repeatedly 
hailed the country’s political stability (World Bank 1984, 1; 
1986, 2; 1989, 3), as well as its concern for the rural population, 
its effective administration, and its prudent, realistic management 
(World Bank 1989, 2; 1989, 3; 1991, 1; 1991, 1).”5 Against these 
claims, Peter Uvin in his book Aiding Violence, argues that the 
myth of apolitical intervention permitted intervention to occur 
as if untouched by sensitive political questions. In other words, the 
political realities of Rwanda did not exist.
Ethnic inequality; institutionalized, state organized racism; regional 
politics; lack of dignity and self-respect; the generalized presence of 
impunity and fear in the absence of justice; human rights violations; the 
oppressive presence of the state, and the like are emphatically not parts of 
this “solvable problem” or of the mandate of development agencies; they are 
thus evacuated, ignored, consider not to exist.6
Paid for by international actors, the narrow focus of development, 
inadvertently legitimized the central state, while altogether failing 
to benefit those targeted by the programs. For Peter Uvin, the 
aggrandizement of the central state, with the marginalization of 
the citizenry, created an acute system of structural violence.
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Rwanda is ‘paradise’, so they say - at least, in comparison to Goma’s 
purgatory. It is liberating enough getting out of the Congo for sure, 
but I have little understanding why Rwanda has this label. Several 
cabs wait on the other side of the border. I walked along the lake. 
Gisenyi, where it is wealthy it is indeed beautiful, but so is Goma. 
The bus station, which I have a great deal of trouble finding, is a 
depressing place. Set on top of a big hill, men with missing arms, 
legs, eyes, or sanity, all desperately seek welfare from those with 
mobility, (read: wealth). ten or so bus companies vie for your three 
USD ticket. ‘Please sir, I spoke to you first’, ‘don’t trust him, he’s a 
cheating liar, his bus company is a scam’, ‘buy from me’, ‘who’s the 
liar’? I arbitrarily choose the first guy’s bus and got on. Eventually 
he extracted himself from the tussle and gives me my ticket. 
The bus from Gisenyi leaves exactly on time. It doesn’t wait 
until it’s full. We weave our way through the basket hills, every 
fertile hill terraced and immaculately irrigated. The road itself is 
perfect. A spandex-clad Rwandan cyclist mounted on a carbon-
fiber road bike climbs the hill out of Gisenyi. There are bikes in 
Goma too, for sure, they are just made out of wood slats, driven by 
youthful boys, and exclusively for the purpose of hauling cargo. For 
the sake of their uniqueness these tshukudu are worth elaborating 
on. A frame of two planks of wood intersect to make a cross about 
2 meters long and 1 and a half meters high. The vertical plank is 
used to steer the affixed front wheel, while the horizontal beam 
supports the load. The driver kneels on the beam with one leg 
and pushes with the other. To make the kneeling easier, a flip-flop 
sandal is mounted to cushion the knee, while a stopping-block is 
added to support the foot. 
There were some kids speeding along with these things at the 
refugee camp. I asked if I could challenge one of them to a race 
down the hill, which they enthusiastically accepted. But then I 
chickened out. The roads in Congo are dirt and pocked; they are 
not perfectly paved like in Rwanda. 
3.3
101 PART III : KIGALI
I am sitting on the back deck of a hostel in Kigali. From the hill 
we stand on, there is a tranquil if not pastoral view of the valley 
below. We are in a walled compound again, though given the 
sparse population of this government neighborhood I am not 
quite sure who we are keeping out. In fact, the whole government 
district is quite sleepy. The hostel is quite popular with all sorts of 
westerners. A Dutchman designing HVAC for a brewery, a Finn 
visiting his Swedish NGO girlfriend, an American cop, French 
hippies. The list is common, and pretty endless.  
The building is not particularly noteworthy, more from its 
conformity to western standards then its lack of quality. 20 USD 
a night in a mixed-four dorm room. There is an outward facing 
deck, squat and long, and there is an inward facing deck, sprawled 
with orange couches and tables with ashtrays. Everyday, for several 
days now, the boys have passed every waking hour drinking on the 
front patio of the hostel. They only really get up to buy cigarettes 
around the corner or get something to eat. The Dutchman says he 
is working, the Swede that he is lazy, and the American that he is 
broke.  It is a strange breed of tourist that frequents Rwanda. 
Kigali is a desperately sprawling town. Seeing as the roads 
follow the topography and not a regular order, navigating the 
plethora of hills on foot is tough. I often give up and take a moto-
taxi. Unlike the DRC, Rwandan ATM’s dispense Rwandan francs 
(RF). And also unlike the DRC, the highest franc denomination 
(5000 RF) is worth about 7 USD.  I noticed that there is a 
casino across the street in an upmarket hotel. The American cop 
and I figured we’d check it out. It’s just an ordinary hotel, with 
a convention room retrofitted with gambling games. We are the 
only westerners present though the room is full. The servers are 
the only Rwandans. The host is a burly Eastern European man. The 
gamblers are all Chinese. This is the first and last encounter I had 
with Chinese nationals in either Congo or Rwanda. 
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The historic failing of development in Rwanda, according to Peter 
Uvin, stemmed from the state’s appropriation of aid for its own 
elite evolué, leading to an oppressive system of patronage and wider 
structural violence against the larger population. The omnipresent 
and highly influential aid system, did little to question the political 
system it fed. 1 He points to the continued use of ID cards as an 
example.  “[N]o aid agency ever denounced the official racism 
or the quota system or the ethnic IDs—not even in the 1990s, 
when it was clear that they were being used to prepare for mass 
killings”.2 Used up until 1993, ID cards embodied class and ethnic 
segregation by stipulating where one could visit or work.
Police conduct periodic checks, especially in urban areas, and return all 
those not registered in the locality to their own commune. Property owners 
who do not require tenants to show valid documentation are subject to fines 
and even imprisonment. Undocumented tenants are subject to expulsion.3 
The government argued the measures prevented urban blight 
by disallowing poverty from spreading. As the state apparatus 
controlled the largest opportunities for wealth accumulation, the 
practice isolated the urban elite from the rural masses. Resource 
distribution, starting from foreign aid, funneled to the centralized 
government, then channeled outward, discriminated along ethnic 
lines, wealth lines, and political lines, creating a system of rural 
poverty and urban prosperity reminiscent of colonial patrimonial 
exclusion4. 
Projects like the 4.5 million USD, Mutura Agricultureal 
Development Project (OVAPAM), from 1974–1987, with 
stated goals of reducing erosion, increasing population, and 
donating large tracts of land to rural farming, ultimately failed on 
technological, fiscal and social fronts. 
…A small group of people managed to obtain most of the advantages of the 
multi-million-dollar project: jobs inside and outside the project; free land 
to be cultivated by family members, renters, or political clients; and large 
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herds overgrazing at the expense of the original Tutsi and Hima herdsmen.5
For Uvin and Lemarchand, the traditional framing of the project 
as a failure of mismanagement and ignorance, missed the wider 
political realities of Rwanda.  
To view the OVAPAM project simply as an effort to improve the material 
conditions of the “poor” thus leaves out at least two major intervening 
variables: the manner in which ethnicity affects the definition of the “poor” 
and how traditional forms of social organization [clientelism] operate to 
incorporate the poor into the social matrix of the Mutara. . . . The social 
dynamics operating in the project area proved largely incompatible with 
the very objective of rural development as defined by the Bank, in effect 
denying the poor access to the resources, services and institutional support 
structure that might have allowed them to move up the economic and social 
ladder.6 
The paradox of development in Rwanda was that its uniquely 
strong centralized state - with top-down authority able to enact 
development projects – was also adept at depriving ordinary 
citizens of the ability to affect the conditions they were subject 
too. Failings that were pinned on the rural farmer and not on what 
was perceived as a competent state structure, succeeded largely in 
reinforcing the central power of the state, and not the intended 
recipients.
The ideological tenets of the “developers” and the political requirements of 
the powers that be join in defining development largely without people’s 
input, without much respect for poor people, and often without much 
benefit to them.7 
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By the time the Belgians took possession of the westernmost 
portion of German East Africa, officially called Ruanda-Urundi 
in 1922, the Tutsi monarchy had already established its dominant 
position within the larger area of what is modern day Rwanda. 
With the help of the German colonists in the second half of 
the 19th century, the northern unconquered regions fell into the 
fold of the Tutsi monarchy.1 Paralleling the consolation of Tutsi 
hegemonic power, the rise of tribal myth to justify the colonial 
exclusion underpinned the implosion of future ethnic violence. 
Foremost, the dominant tribal terms — Tutsi, Hutu, and Twa 
— seen contrastingly as socio-economic labels akin to class, or 
as ethnic, if not racial descriptions, have historically held varying 
degrees of codification based on need.2 In the colony and the 
post-colony, the purpose of myth and mythmaking largely stood 
to delineate the wider group’s cohesion both inside and out, in 
addition to the extent of the legitimate authority it could project. 
Early recorded Tutsi mythology, such as the myth of Kigwe, 
centered on the inherent political division created by god: 
So as to test their dependability, God decided to entrust Gahutu, Gatutsi, 
and Gatwa each with a pot of milk to watch over during the night. When 
dawn came, gluttonous Gatwa had drunk the milk; Gahutu had gone to 
sleep and spilt his milk; only the watchful Gatutsi had stayed up through 
the night to keep guard over his milk.3
With the natural ability of the Tutsi stereographically encoded, the 
monarchy enacted a system of land ownership and servitude akin 
to serfdom, justified by their claim to rightful rulership. Colonial 
mythmaking, by way of the Hamitic hypothesis, similarly build 
on the exclusion of the Hutu and the Twa. By weaving a narrative 
of social supremacy, the Belgians, like the Tutsi, cauterized the 
existing hierarchy. The Hamitic myth achieved this by projecting 
European genealogy to one group (the Tutsi) and foreignness to 
the other (the Hutu). Along with the myth of Christian European’s 
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supremacy told by the biblical Curse of Canaan, the Hamitic 
hypothesis justified support for the Tutsi based on their brush 
with ‘grace’ from their origins as Ethiopian Christians.  As the 
myth goes, these pastoral ‘Europeans,’ passing down the Nile, were 
more ‘civilized’ than their darker, agriculturalist Negro brethren. 
The European creation myth, similar to that of the Tutsi, was a 
pretense to justify collusion with the Tutsi. “Tutsi superiority was 
manifested in their tall, arresting physique, their extraordinary 
capacity for self-control, and their ability to exercise authority.”4 
From the origin-myths of colonialism, the invented myths 
of Tutsi supremacy continued in the years before independence. 
Rwandan historiographers, like Alexis Kagame, in publication like 
Code des Institutions Politiques du Rwanda Pré-colonial, published 
in 1952, tried to align Rwandan history with its acute political 
goals, by portraying the Tutsi monarchy as having the seeds of a 
European constitutional monarchy. He argued the Tutsi kingdoms 
history of pre-legal customary codes was innately legal in spirit. 
Presented as a history of the Tutsi, the aims of the publication were 
strategically political. 
Kagame’s painstaking reinterpretation of traditional Rwanda was 
consciously designed to influence the basic constitutional choices facing the 
Belgian trust authorities in the decade preceding independence.5
However, it was not until 1962 with the publication of Jan Vansina’s 
work, L’évolution du Royaume Rwanda des Origines à 1900, that 
the image of the Hamitic-superior civilization imposing it rule on 
the inferior-vanquished tribes lost credence to a far more mixed 
lineage. 
Ironically, much of what made the Hamites so captivating in the Europeans’ 
eyes turned out to be the result of selective cultural borrowing from the 
supposedly inferior agricultural societies.6
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On first impression the Rwandans are by and large more reserved 
than the Congolese. There was no chatter on the bus ride to Kigali 
and it is much harder to extract a smile with my simple words. 
There can be no value judgment in this; Rwandans are a people I 
don’t know.
Kigali is an immaculate city. It is by and large quite sterile, its 
modern infrastructure key to this image. Four-lane roads are all 
newly paved. Curbs are painted a hypnotic black and white. Hills 
are lined with manicured greenery. It is all seemingly maintained 
daily. There is no dirt or decay to speak of. Having come from 
Goma, where there is no regulation at all over the roads, it comes 
as a surprise that given the perfect roads in Rwanda moto-taxi 
passengers are required by law to wear a helmet. It is only a small 
gesture, but it nevertheless signals the presence of state order and 
regulation. 
The work-and-order ethic is so inscribed in the national culture 
of Rwanda that the last Saturday of every month is dedicated 
to public service. Shops close down, and the city is patched up. 
Known as Umuganda, the practice predates colonialism in origin. 
Though communal in spirit — every able body member of society 
participates for the good of others — the work is legally enforced. 
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In the lead up to independence for Rwanda, the external enemy 
of the colonized, the Belgians, was largely replaced by the internal 
enemy of the oppressed, the Tutsi. To the Belgians, the main 
impetus of the Hutu revolution was populist and anti-monarchist 
(against the Tutsi king, Kigeli V). In comparison, it was the radical 
Tutsi elements (such as the Union Nationale Rwandaise), which 
clamored for independence.1 With the Tutsi being dangerously 
close to Lumumba in the Congo, and Communist China, Belgium 
opted to shift support towards the Hutu. The Hutu revolution 
never tried to overcome the historic injustice it faced, it always 
wanted to invert it. After the murder of some 20,000 Tutsi and 
the exodus of up to 120 000 refugees to Uganda, Congo, Burundi, 
and Tanzania, the all-Hutu Parti du Mouvement de l’Emancipation 
Hutu (Parmehutu) won national elections.2 By 1961 with nearly 
all communes across Rwanda in Hutu possession, Rwanda voted 
to become a Republic. At independence, on 1 July 1962 Rwanda 
became a Hutu hegemony. On the same date in Burundi, the Tutsi 
monarchy survived. 
The outward similarity of Burundi and Rwanda — its size, similar 
demographic, shared colonial history, and poverty — did not 
mean that ethnicity was always the prime catalyst for violence 
in Burundi. As Lemarchand remarks, the dominant narrative in 
Burundi at independence was the factional strife between the 
royal Bezi and the Batare.3 It was not until the Hutu elite looked to 
Rwanda and saw an ideal polity that the ethnic framework shifted 
to mirror that of Rwanda. Fearing a Rwandan-like revolution in 
Burundi, the Tutsi elite transformed their fear into exclusion, 
which in turn led to insurrection. The insurrections were violently 
repressed until ultimately, under the banner of ethnic mythmaking, 
the implosion of ethnic tension culminated in the events of 1972. 
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One of the last things the boys and I do is hire some motos to 
take us to a football game. Outside the stadium there are blue and 
white hooligans and drunken dancers, fanatics and partygoers. I 
bought some tickets for us all, for around 3USD. It was either that, 
or 2USD. Lacking the slightest idea what the difference meant, we 
entered our allotted section, and found ourselves to be basically the 
sole occupants of the entire section. Around us, the rest of stadium 
was filling up. The extra money it turned out differentiates those 
who sit in the searing sun and those protected by a large overhead 
canopy. The match consists of the league’s top team against the 
police. Or, an affiliate of the police. Whichever it is, they are called 
‘police’ and they get a full police parade as they enter. Before the 
game starts, the rest of our section is filled with policemen in 
uniform. The game was a terrible display of quality; never have I 
seen a goal scored from a goal kick having ricocheted off the back 
of a witless defender, back over the head of the keeper, into the net. 
The hooligans went nuts taunting the police, only a hair short of 
starting a riot. The police maneuvered around the dividing fence 
into the fan section and started to arrest the spoilers. Woe to them. 
The entire mass of the stadium turned on the wolves in the sheep 
den, and whipped their fury at this over-extension of authority. 
3.9
With an Irish tourist I just met, we visit the Rwandan genocide 
memorial. For those with prior knowledge of the events it is a 
simple, but effective, display of remembrance. Written by the 
victors of the war, the RPF, through the horrid stories of the 
victims - largely but not exclusively the ‘Tutsi’ - the display has the 
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double purpose of maintaining the past’s presence, while subtly 
legitimizing the authority of the victors, the vanquishers of evil. In 
so doing the presentation negates near all political germinations 
of pre-war Rwanda. Politically this sort of selective remembrance 
and amnesia is beneficial to the consolation of power, by way of 
presenting the genocide as the sole political common denominator. 
Unfortunately we arrived too late at the church of Ntarama 
where the April ’94 massacre took place. It was here that some five 
thousand Rwandans took shelter in the church, only to be turned 
over by the clergy, and barbarically murder. We content ourselves 
with walking around the area; daily life just happens: dirt roads, 
motorcycles, fruit-stands, pedestrians and rain. Afterwards we 
hitch a ride back into Kigali. Although the events of the genocide 
happened twenty years ago, it is not a world frozen in time. Only 
one hundred kilometers to the west in Congo, or one hundred 
kilometers to the south in Burundi, the same ethnic/sectarian/
government violence occurs. Settled dust is just that, settled dust. 
Violence is not spontaneous, it is calculated. Violence is not 
random, it is objective. What we praise Rwanda for, its achievement 
in development, is only half the story of legitimization. 
3.11
What followed in the post-independence years for Burundi 
and Rwanda was the development of a field of radicalization 
manipulated by interconnected external and internal events, 
which ebbed and swayed racist public opinion. 
With the end of Tutsi hegemonic rule in Rwanda, the 
transformation of Tutsi refugees into commando units threatening 
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to recapture Rwanda had the effect of increasing fear amongst 
the Hutu that their revolution would collapse. The attacks were 
enough to foment the polarization of Manichean exclusion. As 
Lemarchand writes, 
[I]neffective though [the Tutsi raids] were in bringing down the republic 
[of Rwanda], the impact of these incursions on the radicalization of 
the Kayibanda regime has been profound. Several new elements, all of 
them harbingers of a future apocalypse, came into focus: (a) the growing 
identification of the enemies of the revolution with foreign enemies; (b) 
the conflation into the same subversive frame of exile and resident Tutsi 
elements, the latter supposedly acting as spies (ibbiyetso) for the former; 
and (c) the radicalization of the domestic arena through the elimination of 
moderates.1
It was not Rwanda but Burundi, which would witness the first 
instance of genocide since World War Two. In the aftermath 
of the third failed Hutu coup (1965, 1969, 1972), the largely 
forgotten, rarely emphasized, and never prosecuted events of 
April to November 1972 saw some hundreds if not thousands of 
Tutsi killed during the coup, along with some one to two hundred 
thousand Hutu deaths in the ensuing retributive killings by the 
Tutsi army. 
In an instance of mimetic rivalry and fear of the ‘other’, 
reverberating far beyond the immediate context, the events of 
1972 would instigate reciprocal anti-Tutsi pogroms in Rwanda, 
ultimately paving the way for the 1973 bloodless coup against the 
more moderate Hutu Kayibanda, by the more radical Hutus from 
the north (historically outside the feudal Tutsi domain) under 
Juvénal Habyarimana. 
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With the Irish woman, we continue our tour of Rwanda. After 
going south to the church we head west, back towards Congo. 
Using Ruhengeri as a base we decide to climb a volcano in the 
‘parcs des volcan’. We hire a taxi to take us to the base of the 
mountain where a reception center funnels park visitors. Despite 
the early hour, maybe seven or so, there are a huge number of 
safari-clad mzungus mingling while local guides prepare the day. It 
is a beautiful morning. Almost cartoonishly so. Even for Rwandan 
standards, the environment is unblemished. It’s as though the 
wealth that paid for the new buildings, manicured laws, green 
hedges, and clean uniforms has also bought from the heavens the 
evanescent clouds, damp fields, and hazy distant mountains. We 
pay our 100USD park permit to climb the hill. Every other group 
present is here for the chance to see gorillas at some 700USD a 
person. Though significantly cheaper in the Congo, with the 
violence the parks are closed. Apart from the grounds and the 
personnel, I am not sure where all the money goes. Due to an 
unspecified risk, a corporal and a private of the Rwandan army, 
as well as our tour guide, accompany our ascent: three hours up, 
two down. Our guide is talkative and kindly to a fault. He is a 
robust, older man, with a history of climbing the mountain before 
the days of the park. We passed the site of Dian Fossey’s murder. 
Some kids in tatters were kicking a ball around on our way back to 
the village. They had made a football from old fabric, paper and 
twine and were kicking it around. The bully that I am challenged 
them to a shoot out. Somehow, with a huge imaginary net at my 
disposal I still lost. Good lord those ankle-biters are nimble.
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Sometime near the beginning of thinking about the Congo and 
Rwanda, I came across a story, which, in all likelihood I took out 
of context. It was a speech delivered in Detroit, to an audience of 
African-Americans. Here I paraphrase Malcolm X, ‘You are free, 
but why are you still down’?1 When the speech was delivered in 
1963, the same questions applied to the Great Lakes region of 
Africa, if not most of Africa. 1960 was supposed to be the Year 
of Africa, the year the then Ghanaian president Kwame Nkrumah 
described as “…Africa’s awakening upon the modern world”2. In 
1960, the Congo joined some sixteen other African colonies in 
celebrating independence. Rwanda and Burundi joined a year 
later. At least on paper, Africa was free. In reality it was not, and 
was never meant to be. 
The part I cut out from the speech Message to the Grass Roots, 
was an allegory with three protagonists. The hero was a slave. 
The villain was the unknown master.  Between them was the 
foil, the master’s house. 
…Back during slavery. There was two kinds of  slaves. There was the house 
Negro and the field Negro. The house Negroes - they lived in the house 
with master, they dressed pretty good, they ate good ‘cause they ate his 
food — what he left. They lived in the attic or the basement, but still 
they lived near the master; and they loved their master more than the 
master loved himself. They would give their life to save the master’s house 
quicker than the master would. The house Negro, if  the master said, “We 
got a good house here,” the house Negro would say, “Yeah, we got a 
good house here.” Whenever the master said “we,” he said “we.” That’s 
how you can tell a house Negro. 
       If  the master’s house caught on fire, the house Negro would fight 
harder to put the blaze out than the master would. If  the master got sick, 
the house Negro would say, “What’s the matter, boss, we sick?” We sick! 
He identified himself  with his master more than his master identified 
with himself. And if  you came to the house Negro and said, “Let’s run 
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away, let’s escape, let’s separate,” the house Negro would look at you and 
say, “Man, you crazy. What you mean, separate? Where is there a better 
house than this? Where can I wear better clothes than this? Where can I 
eat better food than this?”3
The house Negro in the story was a slave, but he seemed to 
have forgotten that. Instead he looked to what little he had, what 
little he had been given, and saw his salvation from depravity 
there. If  the master was the one who had created the system 
of  slavery, the secondary character of  the master’s house was 
altogether better at keeping him there; something the master’s 
whip alone could not do.
Although the whip was effective in transforming the native, 
or the primitive, into a docile beast of  burden, it could never 
stem the growth of  the irrational rabidity it created without the 
use of  more violence. With violence alone, its’ ultimate victory 
— the subjugation of  the slave — would be no victory at all, 
since no master could rule over dead men.
If  the whip only ever came as an opposing force’s will, the 
house never acted against the personhood of  the slave. Instead, 
it represented his salvation. Although his subjective depression 
still existed, it no longer mattered; the corporal improvements 
that conditioned his comfort were better than the depravity he 
would face if  they were lost. The small satisfaction of  bodily 
needs habituated the slave into forgetting his story, transforming 
him more effectively into a working animal. His human potential 
to act of  his own course was replaced by the satisfaction of  
satiating nature’s ever-reoccurring life process. From the idea of  
freedom meaning the ability to be born anew — in the image of  
one’s self  and not another’s — freedom meant security against 
the fragility of  bodily life. 
To all but the most rhetorically-minded (and hypocritical), the 
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3.14
In its wake, the 1972 genocide of Hutus in Burundi would 
propagate radicalization of both the Hutu victims and the Tutsi 
elements in power.  When the first Hutu was elected president of 
Burundi on March 28, 1993, the Tutsi army refused to accept the 
legitimacy of the polls. On October 21, 1993, Melchior Ndadaye 
was assassinated six months into his term. In the ensuing violence, 
some 20, 000 Tutsi were killed, with an equal number of Hutu 
killed by the army.1 The Hutu recalled the violence of 1972 to 
justify the killings: “since 1972 it is our blood that’s being spilled! 
Now we hear that President Ndadaye has been killed. If they did 
that, that means we are next.”2, while the Tutsi claimed the murder 
of their innocents revealed an attempt to wipe out the minority 
altogether. Preventative violence was justified in the face of future 
violence. 
If the failed coup of 1972 sparked the genocide in Burundi, the 
civil war in Rwanda has been put forward as an important element 
in the development of genocidal rhetoric in Rwanda. Just as the 
Hamitic hypothesis praised the foreignness of the Tutsi, the myth 
goal of a better world — built up and made secure — is a desirable 
end. However, failing to see the potential shortcomings of the 
modernizing enterprise is to jeopardize its good nature, either by 
legitimizing, or even engendering, violence. In its most crooked 
form, the development fetish of law and architecture has had the 
ability to obfuscate and normalize the actions of political regimes, 
historically to detrimental effects.   
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re-projected in its inverse form cast the Tutsi as an invasive foreign 
species. The war, seen from the Hutu majority, took the form of a 
vanquished oppressor, returning to subjugate the Hutu. 
The Tutsi diaspora’s invasion of north Rwanda largely 
underestimated the strength of the government in 1990, as well 
as the amount of aid the Habyarimana government would receive 
from foreign sponsors, France and Zaire.  Zaire, under Mobutu, 
was historically anti-Museveni, and by extension anti-Kagame, 
while France balked at the possibility an English speaking Kagame 
would withdraw Rwanda from the Francophonie. Initially 
expected to be a quick coup, the war devolved into a protracted 
civil conflict. With the northern cash-crop region under threat by 
the rebels, the economy declined. As accounts of RPF atrocities 
spread, racist ideology was fomented in the media. The Hamitic 
myth returned with a vengeance. As Leon Mugesera, the Hutu 
‘boss’ from Gisenyi said in a much-quoted encouragement to 
fellow Hutu, ‘send the Tutsi back to their country of origins – 
Ethiopia – through the quickest route, via the Akanyaru river…’3 
In other words dead.
3.15
One year into the civil war, multiparty democracy was introduced 
to Rwanda.  If aid and development was brought to post-colonial 
Rwanda on the simplistic notion that order and stability was 
present, then democracy likely could not have come at a time 
of greater instability. The threat posed to the ruling elite by 
multipartisme did not bring about peace. Rather, the elites found 
a familiar enemy to scapegoat. By playing up the threat to Hutu 
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power, the state was able to corral moderates and opposition 
parties to fall in line against the common enemy. 
Two things happened in 1993 that would touch of the 
radicalization off the genocide: the assassination of the Burundian 
Hutu president Melchior Ndadaye, and the signing of the Arusha 
peace accords in Rwanda. If the Burundian events provided 
evidence for the Rwandan Hutu that the Tutsi could not be 
trusted, the Arusha accords would see that the Tutsi would have 
to be trusted with governance. In the Arusha accord, the RPF 
would receive the same number of seats as the ruling National 
Movement for Revolution and Development (MRND), five out 
of twenty-one cabinet seats, and eleven out of seventy seats in 
the transitional national assembly.1 Further, Tutsi in the armed 
forces would make up forty percent of the regular troops and 
fifty percent of the officers.2 Just as Habyarimana radicalized 
political division between moderate and extremist factions of the 
three main opposition parties with the result they emerged his 
staunchest allies (once his bitterest enemies), an acceptance of 
Arushas’ power-sharing measures would allow the RPF room to 
undo all that had been achieved since 1973. The greatest fear for 
the MRND was that Tutsi would form a coalition with southern 
political parties. The MRND’s solution was to scuttle the peace 
accord through violence.3 
There is still debate about who shot down Habyarimana’s 
plane.4 Each side accusing the other: whether Tutsi RPF soldiers 
or extremists in Habyarimana’s inner circle (the akazu). The 
killings started immediately after the plane went down. Whether 
the downed plane was orchestrated by Kagame, or by radical 
Hutu’s bent on framing the Tutsi and removing the last specter of 
Arusha, the first people to be killed after the clash were politically 
motivated opponents, and not, as widely accepted, chosen by 
ethnic criteria. 
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Two categories of potential allies of RPF were targeted: (a) moderate (as 
distinct from “Hutu Power”) Hutu politicians from the south-central 
regions, most of them affiliated with the MDR [party of the former 
Hutu president Kayibanda] and (b) opposition leaders (Hutu and Tutsi) 
The politics of intervention returned to Rwanda with the passe-
partout given to Kagame’s government in the aftermath of the 
genocide.1 The new Rwandan order would be framed in its 
simplest Manichean form: the bad (Hutu) were overcome by the 
good (Tutsi), while the innocent (Tutsi) were betrayed by Western 
inaction. Though to a large extent true, allowing the events to 
shape future action permitted one form of injustice to justify 
another. In first seeking vengeance against the Hutu in the refugee 
camps, indiscriminately reducing all Hutu to génocidaires, and 
then exacting imperial war on the Congo, and finally collapsing 
political space in Rwanda, Kagame has capitalized on the simple 
narrative’s culture of impunity.2 
When Kagame attacked the Hutu refugee camps in 1996, 
which eventually led to the overthrow of  Mobutu, his efforts 
took the pressure off  of  the international community. Within 
3.16
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these actions two problems were solved: the militarized 
refugee camps were dissolved, and the continent’s out of  favor 
‘dinosaur’ was disposed of. When the UN special Rapporteur 
Roberto Garreton led a team of  investigators into the Congo 
to investigate the Rwandan-backed, Tutsi-led murders of  
thousands of  fleeing Hutu refugees, the team was stonewalled 
by Kabila (then under the auspice of  Kagame). The team left 
the country without visiting a single gravesite.3 
As the Second Congo War progressed — the death toll of  
disease and malnourishment in the millions — the development 
project of  Rwanda, financed on the back of  Congo wealth, was 
ignored by foreign donors. As Lemarchand notes, “[b]y turning 
a blind eye to the “imperial” designs of  Rwanda and Uganda in 
eastern Congo, while at the same time rewarding their economic 
performance, donors (World Bank, the United States, and Great 
Britain) are in effect subsidizing their war effort.”4 
Lastly, by restricting pubic space5, assassinating opposition 
figures6, and whitewashing ethnic identities in order to preserve 
ethnic superiority7, the West’s ‘favorite strongman’ was able to 
propel Rwanda into the modern era with unprecedented speed. 
Aid-money continued unabated despite the oppressiveness of  
the regime.8 
If the Congo would be solved by elections in their post-
conflict renaissance, post-genocide Rwanda would be saved by 
development. Despite Rwanda having little strategic interest 
for the US or the UK, New York Times writer Jeffrey Getlleman 
explains how development driven foreign patronage for Kagame 
has reframed political exclusion in Rwanda.  
Many of the diplomats and analysts I talked to weren’t entirely bothered by 
Kagame’s authoritarian streak. Some even told me — and maybe this has 
something to do with the low expectations for Africa — that this is exactly 
121 PART III : KIGALI
what the continent needs: more Kagames, more highly skilled strongmen 
who can turn around messy, conflict-prone societies and get medicine in the 
hospitals and police officers on the street and plastic bags out of the trees.
Liberties aren’t so important in these places, the argument goes, because 
who can enjoy freedom of speech or freedom of the press when everyone 
is killing one another? A premium is put on preserving stability and 
minimizing physical suffering, saving lives from malaria, from hunger, from 
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In Hannah Arendt’s 1971 book The Life of the Mind, she returned 
to the idea of narrative she first touched on in The Human 
Condition. Because the meaning of Action remains unclear until 
the action itself has disappeared, it is the storyteller who is needed 
to “straighten the story.”1 Namely this is because “[the participant] 
cannot see how all the particular things in the world and every 
particular deed in the realm of human affairs fit together and 
produce a harmony.”2 In Homer’s Oddyssey, Arendt points out, it 
is not until Odysseus hears the account of his quarrel with Achilles 
does he understand the significance of his action. “Odysseus, 
listening, covers his face and weeps, though he has never wept 
before, and certainly not when what he is now hearing actually 
happened.”3
I grew up in a radical home, a home whose life and conscious 
center was the dining room table. Sundays especially — but more 
like every day — we sat at the table as a family; we ate for an hour, 
and talked for three. With the not wholly insensible rhetoric of 
a UN general assembly debate, we wrangled and bastardized 
foreign policy, customs and laws, and other rather impersonal 
ideas.  Friends not used to this SNAFU rarely came over. They, 
my parents, had come from politics. Franco’s rule of Spain had 
galvanized conviction in my mom about Autocracy; Labor unions 
and not universities educated my dad about Capitalism. 
After high school, I went around Europe for half a year. At the 
same time, my brother travelled to Latin America. Briefly put, his 
trip was a sketch of illicit and illegal encounters. He spoke of a 
smuggling ship with passage from Panama to Colombia, of a boat 
full of fruit and contraband, two gringos and a crew of drunken 
sailors waiting a fortnight for the coast guard to clear. He found 
his way to a jail in Cartagena, and a soccer game with local youth-
cum-thugs in Medellin. I was firmly protected on rhizomic 
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church streets and international train cabins. With the luxury of 
European rail services, I was able to visit larger hubs (cities) every 
few days, and wider voids (hinterlands) every night. Too poor to 
find paid accommodation, I stopped at whichever station seemed 
most desolate, found a suitably-absent farmer’s field, and passed 
the night. Because it was winter, I had a sleeping bag. Because it 
often rained, I wrapped my sleeping bag in a tarp. The primitive 
cocoon produced daily a quasi-respectable citizen more-or-less 
accepted by the urban citizenry. When heading out of town was 
not feasible, I remained homeless in city parks, parking garages and 
other margins of city space. Really, only the Swiss had a problem 
with this. 
A year later I went with a friend to West Africa. At about this time, 
my brother went to the Middle East. His trip, apart from a tour 
of historical Syria, Jordan and Israel, focused around Palestine. In 
Tallin, West Bank, he joined the non-violent ISM to protest Israeli 
settlement expansion. For his effort he was smacked with rubber 
bullets, beaten and spat on by the IDF, incarcerated by the Israeli 
courts, and eventually deported back to Canada.  The reason: taking 
pictures. Ghana and Burkina Faso, for me, were nothing like that. 
That trip consisted of far less order and served in fact as a gentle 
introduction to disorder.  In remote villages, beheaded goats and 
strangulated chicken were unfortunate victims of animistic rituals. 
Spatially-challenged bus rides (both materially and temporarily) 
complete with a putrid baby’s skull pillowed beside my head for 
three days, a broken seat that crushed the knees of the poor man 
behind me, mechanical failure, pee breaks, dirt rain, drove me — 
and the rest of the bus — close to insanity. In Accra, the Ghanaian 
national fanaticism for their World Cup heroes, the black stars, 
was fantastic. 
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That I grew up regularly wayward in my thoughts — by way of 
making unfounded and ill-conceived connections between 
dissonant ideas — gave me a base for the rejection of authority. 
The notion that the world consisted of an insoluble order grated 
on my natural skepticism. 
Of all the trips my brother and I have been on, I’m not sure which 
has been the most trying for my parents. When my brother’s 
safety was threatened in South America and the Middle East, or 
mine in Africa, my parents somehow saw the merit in the abstract 
idea of knowledge as resistance. Potentially a result of the rabid 
intellectualism of our dining room table, I was begrudgingly 
permitted to go to the DRC. Unfortunately, this most recent 
round of travel did not have a sibling’s spiritual companionship. 
When I went to the DRC and the great lakes region, my brother 
was in law school.  
There was never a particularly good reason to choose the DRC. 
Vanity of course, is always present. Once, on a long isolated trip 
I read the Heart of Darkness.  As an idolizing kid, I watched the 
Rumble in Jungle take place in a city suspended from reality by 
a million T.V. viewers’ eyes. Most recently, I read Che Guevara’s 
Congo Diaries. It was not really the mystery of such a wild place 
that sent me, or the particular ideological firmament of the 
region. First and foremost, like most generators of action I felt 
an indignation at the hypocrisy and abject misery of the worlds 
modernizing project; most heavily felt at the margin of the world’s 
conscious imagination.
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